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The business judgment rule is a judicially created doctrine that pro-
tects directors from personal civil liability for the decisions they make on 
behalf of a corporation. In today’s era of corporate scandals, global fi-
nancial meltdowns, and directorial malfeasance, it has become especially 
important in setting the bar for when directors are appropriately respon-
sible to shareholders for their actions. Traditionally the business judgment 
rule has been regarded as a standard of liability, although it has never 
really been explored or enunciated as such. This view determines eligibil-
ity for business judgment rule protection of a directorial decision after an 
examination of certain preconditions. An alternate view has developed 
that posits the business judgment rule is actually an abstention doctrine, 
and should be applied automatically absent the establishment of the same 
preconditions as the liability standard approach, only to be used as nulli-
fying factors, to shield directors from having to account. The difference 
between the two positions essentially comes down to the order of the re-
quirements, and who has the burden of establishing the existence of the 
factors that would grant or deny business judgment rule protection. 
This Article disagrees with both of the above approaches, and instead 
explores the business judgment rule as a type of immunity by comparing it 
to selected public and private immunities. The policy underpinnings of the 
business judgment rule mirror those of immunities, as does the practical 
impact. This means that the business judgment rule, properly construed, 
would require the director to establish entitlement to protection by prov-
ing that all preconditions for application of the rule are met. Much of the 
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confusion between the courts and circuits could be alleviated by approach-
ing the business judgment rule as a type of immunity, where the proce-
dures and philosophies are much more enunciated. This helps place the 
business judgment rule back as a crucial part in the balancing act between 
directorial autonomy and accountability, which is especially timely given 
the current economic climate. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The accountability of corporate directors has been in the forefront of 
many minds since large-scale malfeasance hit the news with the swift and 
sudden bankruptcy of Enron in 2001. WorldCom and Tyco soon joined the 
ranks of infamy, the beginning of the recent recession saw the collapse of 
Lehman Bros., and corporate ethics made headlines. For example, Well-
Point, Inc. made the news in 2010 when discoveries revealed that the in-
surer had pursued a deliberate policy of cancelling the health insurance of 
women who had been recently diagnosed with breast cancer.1 The “Occu-
py Wall Street” (and other “Occupy” locations) movement, which gained 
an impressive international following in 2011, had as one objective the 
condemnation of corporate greed.2 Corporate, and therefore directorial, 
accountability is clearly a topic of interest for more than just academics. 
Directors owe fiduciary duties to the corporations and shareholders 
that they serve.3 These duties include the duty of care, as well as the duty 
of loyalty, and there are many nuances to each.4 The usual fiduciary rela-
tionship sees breach of these duties as sufficient grounds for liability; 
breach equals liability.5 For directors, however, this is not the case. The 
business judgment rule (BJR) is a judicially created doctrine that protects 
directors from personal liability for decisions made in their capacity as a 
director, so long as certain disqualifying behaviors are not established.6 
How one views the business judgment rule, as a liability rule or as an 
abstention doctrine, drives how the rule is interpreted and accordingly what 
must be considered by the courts, and when, in determining its application. 
The abstention approach presumes automatic application of the business 
judgment rule, and certain disqualifying conditions rebut this presumption.7 
                                                 
1 Murray Waas, Corrected: WellPoint Routinely Targets Breast Cancer Patients, 
REUTERS, (Apr. 23, 2010, 7:28 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/04/23/us-well
point-breastcancer-idUSTRE63M5D420100423. 
2 Michael Rectenwald, Occupy Wall Street: Its Objects, Issues, and Political Meaning, 
Citizens For Legitimate Government (Sept. 26, 2011), http://www.legitgov.org/Occupy-Wall
-Street-Its-Objects-Issues-and-Political-Meaning. 
3 Floyd v. Hefner, No. H-03-5693, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70922, at *21 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 
29, 2006). 
4 Julian Velasco, How Many Fiduciary Duties Are There in Corporate Law?, 83 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 1231, 1232–33 (2010). 
5 For example, an agent has a fiduciary duty to act loyally for the principal’s benefit 
in all matters connected with the agency relationship. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY 
§ 8.01 (2006). Breach of this duty creates liability. 
6 Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 
VAND. L. REV. 83, 90 (2004). 
7 Id. at 90. 
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It would be technically incorrect, although common, to cast these disqualifi-
cations as “preconditions” to the business judgment rule. A precondition 
must generally be met or exist in order for something else to be valid or ap-
ply. Under this reading of the business judgment rule, the rule applies unless 
certain conditions exist, which is inconsistent with viewing the business 
judgment rule as a precondition. Therefore, “precondition” is an inaccurate 
way to describe the factors that nullify the presumption of the business 
judgment rule application. This is a technical point, but in law, the specifics 
of language matter. These putative “preconditions” are more along the lines 
of nullifying conditions: fraud, illegality, self-dealing, absence of a decision, 
and the like. If one of these conditions can be established, the presumption 
of the business judgment rule application is nullified.8 
Casting the business judgment rule as a liability rule generally means 
that an evaluation of sorts will take place before the rule is applied, with 
the plaintiff bearing the burden of proving that a nullifying condition ex-
ists.9 The absence of any nullifying conditions results in the application of 
the business judgment rule to protect directors from personal liability. The 
order in which things must be proven differs depending on which way one 
views the business judgment rule, which primarily affects practitioners 
when deciding how to present cases in which the business judgment rule 
may be involved. Additionally, inconsistencies between courts create un-
certainty, and therefore a unifying interpretation would be helpful to the 
judiciary as well. 
While extant literature interprets the business judgment rule as both a li-
ability standard10 and an abstention doctrine,11 neither one of these ap-
proaches necessarily “fits” with the reality of the business judgment rule as 
it has developed, and the purpose that it fulfills. Since the business judg-
ment rule protects directors from personal liability for actions done in their 
occupation, there is a telling similarity to immunities, which also protect 
individuals from personal liability in certain situations. This Article explores 
the business judgment rule as a form of immunity, with the goal of deter-
mining the appropriateness of that interpretation. 
In Part I, the business judgment rule, its history, and background are 
outlined, and the main interpretations of its role are examined. In Part II, 
different types of immunities are outlined, as well as the public policy un-
derpinning them. The business judgment rule as a form of immunity is then 
explored to determine whether this is a more helpful way to view the rule. 
                                                 
8 Id. at 96 (citing Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968)). 
9 Id. at 94 (quoting Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, 634 A.2d 346, 361 (Del. 1993)). 
10 FDIC v. Stahl, 89 F.3d 1510, 1516 (11th Cir. 1996). 
11 Brewer v. Bristol, 577 F. Supp. 519, 524 (E.D. Tenn. 1983). 
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I. THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE 
A. History, Background, and Role 
The business judgment rule has a long history in America, dating back 
to the nineteenth century.12 Despite its longevity, however, the rule has been 
called “one of the least understood concepts in the entire corporate field,”13 
and it is still acknowledged as widely misunderstood: “Countless cases in-
voke it and countless scholars have analyzed it. Yet, despite all of this atten-
tion, the business judgment rule remains poorly understood.”14 In part, this 
can be attributed to a lack of consensus in the courts. Another contributing 
factor might be that corporations, and the transactions into which they enter, 
have become increasingly complex and continuously evolve.15 Some have 
suggested that complex financial instruments issued by corporations, which 
are poorly understood by many, contributed to the recent financial morass.16 
In addition, the business judgment rule touches on the tension inherent in 
balancing “between government regulation and free markets, between pub-
lic interests and private autonomy.”17 Finally, inter alia, tension also exists 
in balancing directors’ legal authority to manage the corporation with 
shareholders’ right to hold those directors accountable for the decisions 
made on behalf of the corporation.18 
The business judgment rule ensures that decisions made by directors in 
good faith are protected even though, in retrospect, the decisions prove to 
be unsound or erroneous.19 It provides a deference to prevent courts from 
                                                 
12 See Samuel Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 
93 (1979) (dating the business judgment rule to at least the early 1800s). 
13 Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule, 60 BUS. 
LAW. 439, 454 (2005) (“Manne’s statement about the rule remains as true in 2005 as when 
first made in 1967: the business judgment rule is ‘one of the least understood concepts in 
the entire corporate field.’”); Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and 
Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259, 270 (1967). 
14 Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 83–84. 
15 See, e.g., LARRY RITTENBERG, KARLA JOHNSTONE & AUDREY A. GRAMLING, AUDITING: A 
BUSINESS RISK APPROACH 2 (7th ed. 2010) (“Accounting is highly complex—often, in part, because 
companies are entering into increasingly complex transactions and organizational structures.”). 
16 See, e.g. Financial Regulatory Reform, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2011), http://topics
.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/subjects/c/credit_crisis/financial_regulatory_re
form/index.html; ‘Wall Street Got Drunk’ Says Bush, BBC NEWS (July 23, 2009, 7:28 
PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7522335.stm. 
17 Lael Daniel Weinberger, The Business Judgment Rule and Sphere Sovereignty, 27 
T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 279, 281 (2010). 
18 Ann M. Scarlett, A Better Approach for Balancing Authority and Accountability in 
Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 39, 42 (2008). 
19 Business Judgment Rule, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, http://www.law.cornell
.edu/wex/business_judgment_rule (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
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second-guessing business decisions that were made in good faith.20 Since 
most people are risk-adverse,21 if directors had to worry about liability for 
every decision they made, many directors would insist on playing things 
completely safe.22 This would stifle the innovation for which American 
corporations are known, and would ensure that profits would remain 
small. There is a general correlation between risk and return,23 and direc-
tors would be too concerned about their personal liability to take risks with 
the corporation’s business. “It is almost impossible for a court, in hind-
sight, to determine whether the directors of a company properly evaluated 
risk and thus made the ‘right’ business decision.”24 “To impose liability on 
directors for making a ‘wrong’ business decision would cripple their abil-
ity to earn returns for investors by taking business risks.”25 Negative ex-
ternalities might decrease, but so would positive externalities. Society 
would not have as much technological (and therefore social) advancement, 
and corporations would not be such a major part of the economy. Accord-
ingly, the business judgment rule evolved to give some comfort to directors 
that they were not being looked to as guarantors for all corporate actions 
                                                 
20 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled by Brehm v. Eisner, 
746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) (indicating that it is a presumption that in making a business 
decision the directors act on an informed basis in good faith and in the honest belief that 
the action was in the best interests of the company). 
21 Decision-Making Under Uncertainty - Basic Concepts, EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 
CENTER, http://www.econport.org/econport/request?page=man_ru_basics4 (last visited Mar. 
23, 2013). 
22 See Kevin LaCroix, Banking Agencies Challenge California’s Business Judgment 




23 This statement is not without controversy. Some studies have found that it is true that 
a positive relationship exists, some have found a negative relationship, and some have 
found none. See Manuel Nunez Nickel & Manuel Cano Rodriguez, A Review of Research 
on the Negative Accounting Relationship Between Risk and Return: Bowman's Paradox, 30 
Omega 1, 1 (2002), available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305048
30100055X. 
24 In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 964 A.2d 106, 126 (Del. Ch. 
2009) (citing Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 114–15 (“[T]here is a substantial risk that suing 
shareholders and reviewing judges will be unable to distinguish between competent and 
negligent management because bad outcomes often will be regarded, ex post, as having 
been foreseeable and, therefore, preventable ex ante. If liability from bad outcomes, without 
regard to the ex-ante quality of the decision or the decision-making process, however, 
managers will be discouraged from taking risks.”)). 
25 In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 126. 
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being taken whilst at the helm.26 It is meant to prevent armchair judging of 
decisions made by directors in usual circumstances, while leaving some 
room for liability in not-so-usual circumstances, usually ones involving a 
significant degree of malfeasance.27 Many articles have been written explor-
ing director liability, which necessarily entails balancing the authority in-
herent to a director’s position with accountability from various sources, in-
cluding shareholder derivative litigation. The business judgment rule is 
generally the fulcrum used to balance these competing concerns.28 
The role of the business judgment rule has been defined as follows: 
Under Delaware law, the business judgment rule is the offspring of the 
fundamental principle, codified in 8 Del. C. § 141(a), that the business 
and affairs of a Delaware corporation are managed by or under its 
board of directors .... The business judgment rule exists to protect and 
promote the full and free exercise of the managerial power granted to 
Delaware directors.29 
B. Balancing Authority with Accountability 
American business law has long recognized an implied obligation for 
directors to maximize the wealth of their shareholders.30 In order to max-
imize shareholder wealth and grow a corporate enterprise, directors must 
often make business decisions that entail an assumption of risk; very seldom 
does return exist without risk, and there is generally presumed to be a posi-
tive correlation between the two.31 
The Delaware Supreme Court made clear in Stone that directors of 
Delaware corporations have certain responsibilities to implement and 
monitor a system of oversight ... this obligation does not eviscerate the 
core protections of the business judgment rule—protections designed to 
allow corporate managers and directors to pursue risky transactions 
without the specter of being held personally liable if those decisions turn 
out poorly.32 
                                                 
26 See E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened in Delaware 
Corporate Law and Governance from 1992–2004? A Retrospective on Some Key Develop-
ments, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1399, 1424–25 (2005). 
27 Id. at 1422. 
28 Id. 
29 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1975). 
30 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (arguing that a cor-
poration is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders). 
31 Nickel & Rodriguez, supra note 23, at 1. 
32 In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 964 A.2d 106, 125 (Del. Ch. 
2009) (summarizing the holding in Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006)). 
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The tension between authority and accountability thus arises: 
On the one hand ... the modern public corporation simply could not 
exist if directors lacked authority to exercise fiat. On the other hand, 
possession of that power by directors enables them to divert corporate 
profits from shareholders to themselves. Consequently, efforts to hold 
the board accountable necessarily shift some of the board’s decision-
making authority to shareholders or judges.33 
The business judgment rule attempts to strike a workable balance be-
tween directors’ need to exercise authority in running the enterprise on 
one hand, while allowing some accountability on the other, in order to 
prevent the diversion of corporate agendas or assets to serve personal in-
terests. Realistically, it is difficult for a plaintiff to rebut the business 
judgment rule, given that, prior to discovery, the information needed 
might not be readily available.34 
C. Standard of Liability 
A standard of conduct states how an actor should conduct a given activ-
ity or play a given role. A standard of review states the test a court should 
apply when it reviews an actor’s conduct to determine whether to impose 
liability or grant injunctive relief.35 
Courts tend to view the business judgment rule as a standard of liability 
because it forms the test that courts use in determining whether a director’s 
conduct gives rise to personal liability.36 This test requires a plaintiff to 
meet the burden of proof in establishing the existence of certain condi-
tions, such as fraud, illegality, self-dealing, lack of decision by the board, 
or others.37 If the plaintiff does not meet this burden, then the court will 
                                                 
33 Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 103–04. 
34 In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 114–15. For example, in the recent Citigroup 
Shareholder derivative litigation, the plaintiffs’ claims composed of, “generally statements 
from public documents that reflect worsening conditions in the financial markets.” Id. 
35 Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of 
Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437, 437 (1993) [hereinafter Eisenberg, 
The Divergence of Standards]. This is not unlike the law versus morality concept that 
many law students ponder in their first year—we do not legislate morality (for example, 
you have to be nice to people), but much legislation is based on morality (for example, 
killing someone is bad, hitting someone is bad). Aside from the easy situations, it is often 
hard to know where the line is or should be drawn between law and morality. 
36 Id. at 444–45. The business judgment rule is the test courts use in determining whether 
the directors’ conduct gives rise to liability. MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND 
OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 544–49 (8th ed. 2000). 
37 Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 96. 
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apply the business judgment rule to protect the director from personal lia-
bility for the relevant decision. One caveat of the business judgment rule is 
that decisions that are grossly negligent will not be protected.38 Therefore, 
the effect of the business judgment rule in this formulation is to elevate the 
standard of liability for a director’s decision from simple negligence to an 
aggravated or gross level of negligence in order for liability to be found. 
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor39 is often used as an example of the court treat-
ing the business judgment rule as a standard of liability.40 
In Cede, the Delaware Supreme Court explained the function of the 
business judgment rule as precluding “a court from imposing itself unrea-
sonably on the business and affairs of a corporation.”41 The Court quoted 
from an earlier case, stating: 
The rule operates as both a procedural guide for litigants and a substan-
tive rule of law. As a rule of evidence, it creates a “presumption that in 
making a business decision, the directors of a corporation acted on an 
informed basis [i.e., with due care], in good faith and the honest belief 
that the action taken was in the best interest of the company.”42 
“The presumption initially attaches to a director-approved transaction with-
in a board’s conferred or apparent authority in the absence of any evi-
dence of ‘fraud, bad faith, or self-dealing in the usual sense of personal 
profit or betterment.’”43 
Decisions made by a loyal and informed board will not create liability 
for a director, absent evidence that the board’s action was not grounded in 
rational business purpose. A plaintiff wishing to challenge a board’s action 
bears the burden of proving that the board, in making the disputed decision, 
breached one or more of its fiduciary duties of good faith, loyalty, or due 
care.44 If a plaintiff is unable to meet this burden, the business judgment 
rule applies to protect the directors, effectively precluding the courts from 
interjecting themselves into the corporate dealings.45 If, however, the 
plaintiff is successful in meeting her burden of proof, the business judg-
ment rule does not apply and the evidentiary burden shifts to the defendant 
                                                 
38 Id. at 100 (quoting Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 & n.66 (Del. 2000)). 
39 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, 634 A.2d 346 (Del. 1993). 
40 Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 90–91. 
41 Cede, 634 A.2d at 360. 
42 Id. at 360 (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)). 
43 Id. at 360 (citing Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 187 (Del. 1988)). 
44 Id. at 361. 
45 Id. 
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directors to prove to the trier of fact the “entire fairness” of the transaction 
to the plaintiff.46 
1. Fiduciary Duties 
a. Duty of Loyalty 
Since fiduciary duties matter in this formulation of the business judg-
ment rule, a brief exploration of these duties is necessary. As stated earlier, 
the two broad fiduciary duties are the duty of care and the duty of loyalty.47 
The Delaware Supreme Court defined the duty of loyalty of corporate offic-
ers and directors as follows: 
Corporate officers and directors are not permitted to use their position 
of trust and confidence to further their private interests .... A public pol-
icy existing through the years, and derived from a profound knowledge 
of human characteristics and motives, has established a rule that de-
mands of a corporate officer or director, peremptorily and inexorably, 
the most scrupulous observance of his duty, not only affirmatively to 
protect the interests of the corporation committed to his charge, but also 
to refrain from anything that would work injury to the corporation, or 
to deprive it of profit or advantage which his skill and ability might 
properly bring to it, or to enable it to make in the reasonable and lawful 
exercise of its powers. The rule that requires an undivided and unselfish 
loyalty to the corporation demands that there be no conflict between 
duty and self-interest.48 
The Court explained further that “[w]e have generally defined a director as 
being independent only when the director’s decision is based entirely on 
the corporate merits of the transaction and is not influenced by personal or 
extraneous considerations.”49 
To establish a breach of the duty of loyalty, a shareholder plaintiff 
must present evidence that the director was either on both sides of the 
transaction or “derive[d] any personal financial benefit from the sense of 
self-dealing as opposed to a benefit which devolves upon the corporation 
or all stockholders generally.”50 The Delaware Supreme Court has cau-
tioned, however, that “one director’s colorable interest in a transaction” 
has never been sufficient proof to deprive an entire board of the business 
                                                 
46 Id. 
47 Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006). 
48 Cede, 634 A.2d at 361 (emphasis added) (quoting Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 
(Del. 1939)). 
49 Id. at 362. 
50 Id. at 363 (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984)). 
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judgment rule protection, holding that “there must be evidence of disloyal-
ty.”51 It also noted that it had never adopted a bright-line rule for determining 
when the self-interest of one director is sufficient to prevent the business 
judgment rule from protecting board actions.52 
In Cede, the Delaware Court of Chancery found that while one director’s 
(Sullivan’s) independent business judgment was compromised by a promised 
finder’s fee,53 the finder’s fee was not a material interest affecting the overall 
transaction because Sullivan disclosed his interest prior to the board approv-
ing the transaction.54 The court also found that there was a question as to 
another director’s (Ryan’s) loyalty, owing to a conflict of interest.55 On ap-
peal, the Delaware Supreme Court found support for the lower court’s deci-
sion with respect to the situation with Sullivan in 8 Del. C. § 144(a), but 
remanded the issue of Ryan’s loyalty for clarification of the lower court’s 
finding that Ryan’s conflict of interest did not constitute a breach of his duty 
of disclosure.56 On remand, the Court of Chancery established that it had ap-
plied the materiality analysis standard of Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co.57 
In a similar case, Shaper v. Bryan, plaintiff shareholders of the former 
Bank One Corporation (Bank One) filed suit against its board of directors, 
claiming that the directors had breached their fiduciary duties when nego-
tiating and approving the corporation’s merger with J.P. Morgan Chase & 
Co. (J.P. Morgan).58 Plaintiffs alleged that Bank One’s former CEO, James 
Dimon, breached his duty of loyalty by accepting less favorable merger 
terms in return for a promise from J.P. Morgan that he would become 
CEO two years post-merger.59 The court found that the plaintiffs failed to 
allege sufficient facts to show that Dimon was self-interested in the mer-
ger.60 No evidence was presented to prove that Dimon appeared on both 
sides of the merger between Bank One and J.P. Morgan, or that he re-
ceived a personal benefit not shared by shareholders. While plaintiffs al-
leged that Dimon’s negotiations to retain his CEO position at the newly 
formed company constituted self-dealing, Delaware law has routinely re-
jected the notion that a director’s interest in maintaining his office is a de-
bilitating factor.61 
                                                 
51 Id. at 363. 
52 Id. at 364. 
53 Id. at 357–58. 
54 Cede, 634 A.2d at 365. 
55 Id. at 358. 
56 Id. at 372. 
57 493 A.2d 929, 944–45 (Del. 1985). 
58 Shaper v. Bryan, 864 N.E.2d 876, 879 (Ill. App. 2007). 
59 Id. at 880. 
60 Id. at 885. 
61 Id. 
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b. Duty of Care 
Duty of care as defined by the Delaware Supreme Court is the “amount 
of care which ordinarily careful and prudent men would use in similar cir-
cumstances.”62 This court has further articulated the duty of care in Smith 
v. Van Gorkom, as being a director’s duty to exercise an informed business 
judgment.63 Where the context is a proposed merger of domestic corpora-
tions, the Court said further: 
[A] director has a duty under Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 251(b), along 
with his fellow directors, to act in an informed and deliberate manner in 
determining whether to approve an agreement of merger before sub-
mitting the proposal to the stockholders. Certainly, in the merger con-
text, a director may not abdicate that duty by leaving to the sharehold-
ers alone the decision to approve or disapprove the agreement.64 
The Delaware Supreme Court in Cede applied Van Gorkom to find that the 
defendant directors, as a board, breached their duty of care by making an un-
informed decision to approve the sale of the corporation to MAF pursuant to 
a plan of merger for twenty-three dollars per share.65 The case was remanded 
for the plan of merger to be reviewed using entire fairness as the standard.66 
In Shaper, the plaintiffs argued that the board breached its duty of due 
care by failing to inform itself of a “secret no-premium offer”67 allegedly 
made to director and CEO Dimon. Plaintiffs alleged that the J.P. Morgan 
offer price was not based on the corporation’s actual value, but rather was 
“simply the price of delaying his takeover as CEO of the newly formed 
company.”68 The court disagreed, and stated that the board’s duty of care 
did not require a board to be “intimately familiar with every proposal and 
fact during the negotiating process.”69 The court found that there was ample 
evidence showing that the board had properly exercised its duty of care in 
reviewing joint proxy statements and a formal opinion from an investment 
banking firm that the proposed merger was fair and presented an equitable 
exchange ratio to Bank One stockholders.70 
                                                 
62 See, e.g., Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963); see 
also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 (2002). 
63 Smith, 488 A.2d at 872. 
64 Id. at 873. 
65 Cede, 634 A.2d at 367. 
66 Id. (applying Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711). 
67 Shaper, 864 N.E.2d at 886 (referring to a New York Times article citing sources 
stating that Dimon had offered to sell Bank One to J.P. Morgan at no premium if he were 
made CEO immediately; JP Morgan refused and Dimon then negotiated the deal at issue). 
68 Id. 
69 Id. (citing Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 259 (Del. 2000)). 
70 Id. at 886–87. 
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2. Criticism 
Critics of the view that the business judgment rule is a standard of lia-
bility posit that the business judgment rule requires deference to be the 
presumption, mandating a judicial “hands-off” policy unless certain pre-
conditions for review are met.71 Noted academic Professor Stephen Bain-
bridge is a key critic claiming that viewing the business judgment rule as a 
standard of liability puts “the cart before the horse,” in that the courts ex-
amine the cases for instances of misconduct and in the absence of those 
instances, then takes the requisite “hands-off” approach.72 With authority 
resting in the directors to run the affairs of the corporation, excessive re-
view from the courts would shift true authority from the directors to the 
courts.73 Therefore, judicial review of director’s decisions should be the 
exception rather than the norm.74 Under this formulation of the rule at 
least a limited judicial review is the norm, which is viewed as undesirable 
and inefficient. 
Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare is also used as an example75 of the 
business judgment rule formulation as a standard of liability: “The busi-
ness judgment rule, as a standard of judicial review, is a common-law 
recognition of the statutory authority to manage a corporation that is vest-
ed in the board of directors.”76 Key themes found within case law and 
scholarly articles interpreting this standard of review include (1) directors 
acting in good faith can use the business judgment rule as a shield from 
personal liability,77 and (2) the rule simply moves the liability bar from mere 
negligence to a lower standard such as gross negligence or recklessness.78 
D. Abstention Doctrine 
Professor Bainbridge takes an alternate view of the business judgment 
rule, where the courts refrain from reviewing board decisions unless cer-
tain conditions for review are met.79 He argues that the business judgment 
rule is better viewed as a doctrine of abstention, although the courts rarely 
                                                 
71 See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 94. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 103–04. 
74 Id. at 96. 
75 Id. at 90. 
76 Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 927 (Del. 2003). 
77 Franklin A. Gevurtz, Corporation Law 282–84 (2000) (discussing the analogies be-
tween director and physician liability). 
78 Id. (discussing the analogies between director and physician liability). 
79 Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 87. 
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use this phrase in conjunction with business judgment rule interpretation.80 
The presumption is that directors’ decisions are protected by the business 
judgment rule, and therefore not open to judicial scrutiny, unless this pre-
sumption is rebutted.81 Professor Bainbridge argues that “corporate deci-
sion-making efficiency can be ensured only by preventing the board’s de-
cision-making authority from being trumped by courts under the guise of 
judicial review.”82 The abstention approach, under which “courts in fact 
refrain from reviewing board decisions unless exacting preconditions for 
review are satisfied,”83 reduces the risk of hindsight bias: “If a jury knows 
that the plaintiff was injured, the jury will be biased in favor of imposing 
negligence liability even if, viewed ex ante, there was a very low probabil-
ity that such an injury would occur and taking precautions against such an 
injury was not cost effective.”84 Shareholders “prefer the risk of director 
error to that of judicial error.”85 “Abstention contemplates judicial reticence, 
but leaves open the possibility of intervention in appropriate circumstanc-
es.”86 Refusing to review directors’ operational decisions is proper, absent 
exceptional circumstances, “because most such decisions do not pose much 
of a conflict between the interests of directors and shareholders.”87 
Professor Bainbridge sees the abstention doctrine as a better means by 
which corporate law can resolve the inherent tension between authority 
and accountability—and thus the business judgment rule is “better under-
stood as a doctrine of abstention which guides courts to refrain from re-
viewing board decisions unless exacting preconditions for review are sat-
isfied.”88 The business judgment rule as “an abstention doctrine ... creates 
a presumption against judicial review of duty of care claims.”89 Thus, 
when a court is presented with a claim accusing directors of breaching their 
duty of care, a court “will abstain from reviewing the substantive merits of 
the directors’ conduct unless the plaintiff can rebut the business judg-
ment rule by showing that one or more of its preconditions are lacking.”90 
                                                 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 85. 
83 Id. at 87. 
84 Id. at 114 (discussing Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Eco-
nomics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1523–27 (1998)). 
85 Id. at 122. 
86 Id. at 127. 
87 Id. at 129. 
88 Id. at 87. 
89 Stephen Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule Is NOT a Standard of Review, 
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Professor Bainbridge believes that the question of “whether ... the board 
exercised reasonable care is irrelevant.”91 Professor Bainbridge advocates 
using the Brehm v. Eisner formulation of the business judgment rule, 
which opines that: 
Courts do not measure, weigh or quantify directors’ judgments. We do 
not even decide if they are reasonable in this context. Due care in the 
decision-making context is process due care only .... Thus, directors’ 
decisions will be respected by courts unless the directors are interested 
or lack independence relative to the decision, do not act in good faith, 
act in a manner that cannot be attributed to a rational business purpose 
or reach their decision by a grossly negligent process that includes the 
failure to consider all the material facts reasonably available.92 
In order for the business judgment rule to apply all that need be shown is 
that the “directors employed a rational process and considered all material 
information available.”93 This would avoid the situation presented in Cede 
where “courts ... second-guess board decisions if it is ‘reasonable’ to do so.”94 
Shlensky v. Wrigley is a classic example of the abstention doctrine for-
mulation of the business judgment rule.95 Shlensky, a minority shareholder 
at the time, challenged Philip Wrigley’s famous refusal to install lights in 
Wrigley Field so the Chicago Cubs could play home games in the evening. 
Shlensky felt that baseball games in the evening would encourage higher 
game attendance and ultimately lead to higher revenues for the corporation. 
The court reasoned, inter alia, that “in a purely business corporation ... the 
authority of the directors in the conduct of the business of the corporation 
must be regarded as absolute when they act within the law, and the court is 
without authority to substitute its judgment for that of the directors.”96 The 
court also concluded, “[t]he response which courts make to such applica-
tions is that it is not their function to resolve for corporations questions of 
policy and business management. The directors are chosen to pass upon 
such questions and their judgment unless shown to be tainted with fraud is 
accepted as final.”97 
                                                 
91 Id. 
92 Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000). 
93 In re Citigroup Inc. Derivative Litigation, 964 A.2d 106, 122 (Del. Ch. 2009) (citing 
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 259 (Del. 2000); In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 
698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996)). 
94 Bainbridge, supra note 89, at 4. 
95 Shlensky, 237 N.E.2d at 781. 
96 Id. at 779 (quoting Toebelman v. Mo.-Kan. Pipe Line Co., 41 F. Supp. 334, 339 (D. 
Del. 1941)). 
97 Shlensky, 237 N.E.2d at 779 (quoting Davis v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 142 A. 
654 (Del. Ch. 1928)). 
2013] BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE AS AN IMMUNITY 537 
1. Critique of Abstention Doctrine Formulation of the Business 
Judgment Rule 
Not many academics have delved into Professor Bainbridge’s interpre-
tation of the business judgment rule, but at least one takes exception to the 
idea of the business judgment rule as an Abstention Doctrine.98 To fully un-
derstand this position, the Abstention Doctrine must be further explored. 
a. History of Abstention Doctrine 
At its root, the Abstention Doctrine addresses the balance of power be-
tween two autonomous levels of government, each with inherent powers 
granted or delegated to them through the federalist system.99 Usually it is 
used in the context of a federal court declining to review subject matter it 
feels is more appropriate for state courts. The abstention doctrine was first 
formulated in 1941 in Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., where 
the Supreme Court declined to intervene in the case, stating: “federal courts 
ought not to enter unless no alternative to its adjudication is open.”100 This 
case brought together several previous cases where the Supreme Court had 
declined to insert itself,101 and led to the enunciation of the new doctrine to 
reflect the principle of non-intervention or abstention: 
These cases reflect a doctrine of abstention appropriate to our federal 
system whereby the federal courts, “exercising a wise discretion,” 
restrain their authority because of “scrupulous regard for the rightful 
independence of the state governments” and for the smooth working of 
the federal judiciary. This use of equitable powers is a contribution of 
the courts in furthering the harmonious relation between state and 
federal authority without the need of rigorous congressional restriction 
of those powers.102 
                                                 
98 Scarlett, supra note 18, at 69–70 (discussing Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 85). 
99 It has the general purpose of sorting out the relationship between state and federal 
court functions, and “preserve the balance between state and federal sovereignty.” 
Mathew D. Staver, The Abstention Doctrines: Balancing Comity with Federal Court 
Intervention, 28 SETON HALL L. REV. 1102, 1102 (1998). For an interesting treatment of 
the Abstention Doctrine, see Tonya Kowalski, A Tale of Two Sovereigns: Danger and 
Opportunity in Tribal-State Court Relations (forthcoming) (on file with author). 
100 R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 498 (1941). 
101 Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89, 95 (1935) (refraining from en-
forcement of criminal statute absent exceptional circumstances); Pennsylvania v. Williams, 
294 U.S. 176, 177 (1935) (refraining from action when state has detailed procedures for 
action); Gilchrest v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 279 U.S. 159, 209 (1929) (respecting 
authority of state court decision on arguable state law interpretation); Fenner v. Boykin, 271 
U.S. 240, 240 (1926) (abstaining from action absent extraordinary circumstances). 
102 R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941) (citations omitted). 
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Soon after the decision in Pullman, a variation on the abstention doc-
trine was developed in Burford v. Sun Oil Co.103 This variation, dubbed 
the Burford Abstention Doctrine, went further than the Pullman decision, 
as the Burford court envisioned a “hands-off policy” while the Pullman 
court seemed to posit the abstention more as a “postponement.”104 The 
Burford court quoted the Pullman court, stating that a federal court should 
“stay its hands” in deciding a matter of state law.105 The Court stated that 
interfering with a state court decision would only lead to “[d]elay, misun-
derstanding of local law, and needless federal conflict with the State poli-
cy.”106 It also held that there are “circumstances in which a federal court 
should decline to hear at all a case of which it has jurisdiction in order to 
avoid needless conflict with the states ....”107 
The doctrine further evolved and narrowed in Colorado River Water 
Conservation Dist. v. United States,108 becoming known as the Colorado 
River Abstention Doctrine. In this case, the court “recognized that there are 
‘exceptional’ circumstances in which dismissal of a federal suit due to the 
presence of a concurrent proceeding may be appropriate for reasons of wise 
judicial administration.”109 “Under the Colorado River Abstention Doctrine, 
a federal court may abstain from hearing a claim when there is a pending 
state proceeding only under ‘exceptional circumstances.’”110 Many factors 
are considered before dismissing a case, and abstention from the exercise of 
federal jurisdiction is to be the exception rather than the rule.111 
The doctrine of abstention, under which a district court may decline to 
exercise or postpone the exercise of its jurisdiction, is an extraordinary 
and narrow exception to the duty of a district court to adjudicate a con-
troversy properly before it. Abdication of the obligation to decide cases 
can be justified under this doctrine only in the exceptional circum-
stances where the order to the parties to repair to the state court would 
clearly serve an important countervailing interest.112 
                                                 
103 Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 332 (1943). 
104 17A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 4241 
(3d ed. 1998). 
105 Burford, 319 U.S. at 334. 
106 Id. at 327. 
107 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 104 (referring to § 4244 and its procedural consequen-
ces, § 4245). 
108 Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976). 
109 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 104 (paraphrasing Colo. River Water Conservation 
Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976)). 
110 Staver, supra note 99, at 1130 (paraphrasing and quoting Colo. River Water 
Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813–14 (1976)). 
111 Colo. River Water Conservation Dist., 424 U.S. at 813. 
112 Staver, supra note 99, at 1130 (quoting Colo. River Water Conservation Dist., 424 
U.S. at 813–14) (citations and quotations omitted). 
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The Court, seeking to limit the application of the doctrine, outlined only 
three instances where the Abstention Doctrine would be appropriately used: 
1. “[I]n cases presenting a federal constitutional issue which 
might be mooted or presented in a different posture by a 
state court determination of pertinent state law.”113 
2. “[W]here there have been presented difficult questions of 
state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public 
import whose importance transcends the result in the case 
then at bar .... In some cases, however, the state question it-
self need not be determinative of state policy. It is enough 
that exercise of federal review of the question in a case and 
in similar cases would be disruptive of state efforts to estab-
lish a coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial 
public concern.”114 
3. “[W]here, absent bad faith, harassment, or a patently inva-
lid state statute, federal jurisdiction has been invoked for 
the purpose of restraining state criminal proceedings ....”115 
b. Critique 
“The key underlying assumption for Professor Bainbridge’s proposal 
is that the courts’ current approach to the business judgment rule inade-
quately respects the value of directors’ authority—meaning directors’ de-
cision-making power.”116 However, in considering whether the business 
judgment rule is an abstention doctrine, as proposed by Professor Bain-
bridge, it is impossible to overlook certain other things that do not fit with 
this formulation of the business judgment rule. 
First of all, the Abstention Doctrine recognizes the tension inherent be-
tween two levels of government, each of which has inherent powers, 
granted through the creation of a federalist system, in which certain of 
those powers might overlap when fully exercised.117 It is about the balance 
of power.118 Under no circumstances can private corporations be viewed 
as having inherent grants of power that transform them into autonomous 
                                                 
113 Colo. River Water Conservation Dist., 424 U.S. at 814 (citations omitted). 
114 Id. (citations omitted). 
115 Id. at 816 (citations omitted). 
116 Scarlett, supra note 18, at 67 (discussing Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 85). 
117 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43–44 (1971). 
118 For an interesting treatment of the Abstention Doctrine in the context of tribal law, 
see Tonya Kowalski, A Tale of Two Sovereigns: Danger and Opportunity in Tribal-State 
Court Relations (forthcoming) (on file with author). 
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entities, not subject to any level of government, especially when corpora-
tions owe their very existence to legislation issued by state governments. It 
also cannot be said that a director, by virtue of taking control of a private 
corporation, can be seen to have assumed a mantle of inherent power such 
that she is an autonomous being free from state control. She is still just a 
person who has a particular job—“the tension in such cases is in the pure-
ly private relationship between directors and shareholders.”119 When con-
sidering the players in the business judgment rule, the directors of a corpo-
ration, the shareholders who were “wronged,” and the courts that would 
determine whether directors have personal liability for their actions as di-
rectors, the directors are not even remotely analogous to a level of gov-
ernment that is granted a power that would make them separate but some-
how equal to the state. This fact alone makes it difficult to stretch the 
Abstention Doctrine to the business judgment rule. 
Second, application of the Abstention Doctrine does not mean that the 
subject matter before the court is permanently protected from the review of 
any court. The doctrine presumes that a court is in fact going to be review-
ing the case—the only thing in issue is which court, not whether a court has 
the ability to hear the subject matter at all. In fact, that is the whole point 
behind the Abstention Doctrine—the federal courts stepping out of the way 
so the state courts can handle the matter. Professor Bainbridge’s business 
judgment rule formulation would see the entire subject matter of a director’s 
liability removed from the court’s review, except in exceptional circum-
stances,120 which is a very different matter from determining which court 
has jurisdiction. In one important way, he is correct—if the business judg-
ment rule applies, whether as a presumption or after an evaluation, the ef-
fect is that the courts abstain from evaluating a director’s decision on the 
merits. But just because the effect is a small “a” abstention, this doesn’t 
mean that it is appropriate for the capital “A” Abstention Doctrine, consid-
ering the capital “A” Abstention Doctrine is already in existence with a very 
different and well-defined meaning. 
Finally, the Abstention Doctrine is to be applied with a light touch, and 
with judicious restraint. To view the business judgment rule as an Absten-
tion Doctrine would again strain interpretation of the Abstention Doctrine 
immensely, since no matter what formulation you interpret it under, the busi-
ness judgment rule is the dominant position. The Supreme Court has made 
it very clear that the Abstention Doctrine is not the dominant application, 
                                                 
119 Scarlett, supra note 18, at 77. 
120 Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 87–88. 
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but is rather an exception to the usual way of things.121 This would pervert 
the Abstention Doctrine as developed by the Supreme Court into some-
thing quite unrecognizable. 
Another criticism of Professor Bainbridge’s approach to the business 
judgment rule is that it has no practical impact. In the context of derivative 
litigation, Ann Scarlett states, “the proposed abstention approach will not 
significantly alter shareholder derivative lawsuits, because it operates es-
sentially the same in the context of litigation as the current formulation of 
the business judgment rule and otherwise is too limited to be useful as a 
replacement for the current formulation.”122 She also noted that, “courts 
are unlikely to adopt the proposed Abstention Doctrine approach to the 
business judgment rule, because it does not fit within the Abstention Doc-
trines commonly recognized by courts and abstention otherwise does not 
present a desirable approach.”123 
In outlining why the two approaches are similar, Scarlett states “both 
the current approach and the proposed abstention approach establish a pre-
sumption of non-review, and courts will not review the challenged con-
duct unless the plaintiff can rebut that presumption.”124 This means that 
the methods for rebutting the presumption of the business judgment rule 
are similar because, “both approaches limit courts to reviewing the deci-
sion-making process and not the merits of the decision.”125 “Furthermore, 
both approaches operate the same after the court determines whether the 
presumption of the business judgment rule has been rebutted ... the current 
approach ... protects the directors from liability and the case ends ... simi-
larly ... under the proposed abstention approach ... the court abstains from 
further review.”126 
                                                 
121 Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 128 (“If the business judgment rule is framed as an 
Abstention Doctrine, however, judicial review is more likely to be the exception rather 
than the rule.”)); Scarlett, supra note 18, at 79 (comparing Colo. River Water Conservation 
Dist., 424 U.S. at 813 (“Abstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is the 
exception, not the rule.”);. Scarlett states that, “the Supreme Court has made it clear that 
abstention is the ‘extraordinary’ exception and not the rule. Professor Bainbridge ... 
reverses that principle ... abstention would be the rule and judicial review would be the 
extraordinary exception.” Id. 
122 Scarlett, supra note 18, at 70. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 70–71. 
125 Id. at 72 & n.191 (discussing Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 128 (“[S]tating that under 
his abstention approach: ‘[t]he court begins with a presumption against review. It then 
reviews the facts to determine not the quality of the decision, but rather whether the 
decision-making process was tainted by self-dealing and the like.’”)). 
126 Scarlett, supra note 18, at 72 (comparing Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument 
Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 64 (Del. 1989) and Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 87). 
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If the plaintiff successfully rebuts the presumption of the application of 
the business judgment rule, “under either ... approach, the case proceeds.”127 
As such, the abstention approach is 
too limited to be useful as a replacement for the current formulation ... 
[b]ecause [it] would not prohibit court review in cases alleging fraud or 
breaches of the duties of loyalty or good faith, it is designed to apply 
only to a small category of business judgment rule cases—those alleg-
ing a breach of the fiduciary duty of care.128 
II. IMMUNITIES FOR COMPARISON 
The effect of an immunity is to insulate the recipient of the immunity 
from civil liability for actions undertaken by individuals acting in a specific 
capacity.129 Similarly, the effect of the business judgment rule is to insulate 
the recipient from civil liability for actions undertaken by individual direc-
tors acting in a capacity related to their job as directors. This similarity pro-
vides a starting point for an inquiry into the nature and extent of certain im-
munities to better compare immunities with the business judgment rule. 
A. Selected Public Actor Immunities 
1. Judicial Immunity 
Judicial immunity is a form of legal immunity, and has been in place for 
centuries to protect judges from personal lawsuits brought by disgruntled 
and angry litigants.130 Although not without controversy,131 this protection 
continues to be upheld by the modern judiciary.132 Stump v. Sparkman133 is 
                                                 
127 Scarlett, supra note 18, at 72. 
128 Id. at 73. 
129 This sometimes extends to criminal prosecution, such as in the case of diplomatic 
immunity, but this aspect of immunity will not be explored in this Article. 
130 J. Randolph Block, Stump v. Sparkman and the History of Judicial Immunity, 1980 
DUKE L.J. 879, 879 (1980). 
131 See generally Roger C. Cramton, Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative 
Action: The Need for Statutory Reform of Sovereign Immunity, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, 
and Parties Defendant, 68 MICH. L. REV. 387, 389 (1970); Antonin Scalia, Sovereign 
Immunity and Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative Action: Some Conclusions 
from the Public-Lands Cases, 68 MICH. L. REV. 867, 867 (1970). See, e.g., Don B. Kates, 
Jr., Immunity of State Judges Under the Federal Civil Rights Acts: Pierson v. Ray 
Reconsidered, 65 NW. U.L. REV. 615, 621 (1970); Douglas K. Barth, Note, Immunity of 
Federal and State Judges from Civil Suit-Time for a Qualified Immunity?, 27 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 727, 728 (1977). 
132 See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9 (1991). 
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the hallmark case used to illustrate the broad protective spectrum provided 
by judicial immunity in the context of rather appalling facts.134 In Stump, a 
mother petitioned an Indiana state judge to grant her request to have her fif-
teen-year-old daughter surgically sterilized.135 The filed petition was heard 
ex parte, without any evidence, and the petition was granted the same day it 
was filed.136 There was no notice to the girl, no appointment of a guardian 
ad litem, and no hearing in which the girl could participate.137 The order 
lacked statutory authority for the action, and was never filed with the clerk 
of the circuit court.138 After Judge Stump approved the mother’s request, 
the young girl was told by her mother that she was to have her appendix 
removed, and the next day a tubal ligation was performed that rendered 
the girl sterile.139 Later, the girl married, and after seeking medical help to 
explain why she had failed to become pregnant, she discovered that she 
could never have children.140 After uncovering the full truth of the events 
behind her sterilization, she sued the judge, among others, under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983.141 The case ended up at the Supreme Court, which determined: 
[T]he scope of the judge’s jurisdiction must be construed broadly where 
the issue is the immunity of the judge. A judge will not be deprived of 
immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, 
or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability 
only when he has acted in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction.”142 
The disturbing facts and eventual decision by the judge in Stump v. Sparkman 
illustrate the broad protection from personal liability afforded judges under 
the judicial immunity doctrine, including actions brought under § 1983. 
a. A Brief Historical Background 
Under the common law of England: 
Sir Edward Coke, the ardent advocate of absolute immunity for royal or 
superior court judges in England sought to ground the doctrine on the 
                                                                                                                         
133 Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978). 
134 See generally 2 SHELDON NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: 
THE LAW OF SECTION 1983 § 7:14 (2009). 
135 Stump, 435 U.S. at 351. 
136 Id. at 349. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. at 360. 
139 Id. at 353. 
140 Id. at 349. 
141 Stump, 435 U.S. at 349. 
142 Id. at 356–57. 
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rationale that the administration of justice “concerns the honour and 
conscience of the King” and that the judges who represent the King 
“are only to make an account to God and the King.”143 
Historically, judicial immunity was a corollary to that theory. Since the 
King could do no wrong, the judges, his delegates for dispensing justice, 
“ought not to be drawn into question for any supposed corruption (for this 
tends) to the slander of the justice of the King.” Because the judges were the 
personal delegates of the King, they should be answerable to him alone.144 
Although founded more in public policy than in deference to the King, 
courts in the United States have adopted and refined the doctrine of judi-
cial immunity.145 
U.S. circuit courts have recognized that Anglo-American common law 
provides judicial immunity, a “sweeping form of immunity” for acts per-
formed by judges that relate to the “judicial process.”146 The U.S. Supreme 
Court has stated judicial immunity is one of the “few doctrines” that has 
been “solidly established at common law”147 from the beginning of the judi-
cial system in the United States.148 
The immunities examined in this Article rest on the interpretation of 
42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides in part: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any state or territory or the District of Columbia, 
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or 
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 
                                                 
143 K.G. Jan Pillai, Rethinking Judicial Immunity for the Twenty-First Century, 39 
HOWARD. L.J. 95, 104 (1995) (quoting Floyd v. Barker, 77 Eng. Rep. 1305, 1307 (K.B. 1607)). 
144 Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 565, at n.5 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citation 
omitted). Justice Douglas disagreed with this argument in his dissent. 
145 Pierson, 386 U.S. at 548; Stump, 435 U.S. at 356. 
146 In re Castillo, 297 F.3d 940, 947 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Forrester v. White, 484 
U.S. 219, 225, (1988)). 
147 “Few doctrines were more solidly established at common law than the immunity of 
judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction, as 
this Court recognized when it adopted the doctrine, in Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 
(1872).” Pierson, 386 U.S. at 553–54 (Warren, J.); see also Hale v. Lefkow, 239 F. Supp. 
2d 842, 844 (C.D. Ill. 2003); Mercer v. HCA Health Services of Tennessee, Inc., 87 S.W.3d 
500, 503–04 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002), appeal denied (Sept. 16, 2002). 
148 According to Jan Pillai, the Court has misinterpreted the common law under-
standing, citing that “in 1871 only thirteen states recognized the rule of absolute judicial 
immunity, six states denied immunity for malicious acts, and eighteen states never 
conclusively ruled on the issue of immunity.” Pillai, supra note 143, at 105. For a similar 
argument, see Margaret Z. Johns, A Black Robe Is Not a Big Tent: The Improper Expansion 
of Absolute Judicial Immunity to Non-Judges in Civil-Rights Cases, 59 SMU L. REV. 265, 
270 (2006) [hereinafter Johns, A Black Robe]. 
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rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or 
other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought 
against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s 
judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a de-
claratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For 
the purpose of this section, any act of Congress applicable exclusively 
to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the 
District of Columbia.149 
A full treatment of § 1983 is beyond the scope of this Article, but a brief 
overview is needed to give context for further analysis of the implications of 
judicial and prosecutorial immunity. A series of legislative and judicial de-
cisions after the Civil War empowered and emboldened judicial immunity 
as we understand it today. At the close of the Civil War, Congress enacted 
the Thirteenth Amendment to outlaw slavery.150 
[D]espite the Thirteenth Amendment, a reign of violence took hold in the 
South. In response, Congress adopted the first Reconstruction civil-rights 
statute in 1866. Doubting its constitutional authority to pass this statute, 
Congress proposed the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866, which forbids 
States from denying citizens due process and the equal protection of the 
law. In 1871, buttressed by the constitutional authority of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Congress essentially re-adopted the 1866 civil-rights statute 
that is codified today at 42 U.S.C. § 1983.151 
Section 1983 was not employed often during its first fifty years,152 but 
gradually gained importance as a tool. By 1964, evidenced by the Monroe v. 
Pape decision, § 1983 had become an important remedy for civil rights viola-
tions by state and local officials.153 Like Stump, most plaintiffs who allege 
civil rights violations seek a remedy against a judge through a § 1983 action. 
                                                 
149 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (emphasis added). “The portion in italics was added by an 
amendment in 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-170, and the portion underlined was added by an 
amendment in 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317, § 309(c) ... to provide judges some protection from 
injunctive relief after the decision in Pulliam v. Allen.” Ivan E. Bodensteiner, Congress Needs 
to Repair the Court’s Damage to § 1983, 16 Tex. J. C.L. & C.R. 29, 30–31 n.1 (2010). 
150 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
151 Johns, A Black Robe, supra note 148, at 268. 
152 “Despite its seemingly broad language, § 1983 was relatively inactive during its first 
fifty years, with only twenty-one reported cases decided under the section between 1871 
and 1920.” Bodensteiner, supra note 149, at 31. “Though a revolutionary shift, § 1983 was 
essentially dormant for nearly 100 years.” Johns, A Black Robe, supra note 148, at 269. 
“[Section] 1983 was largely ineffectual for almost one hundred years.” Malia N. Brink, A 
Pendulum Swung too Far: Why the Supreme Court Must Place Limits on Prosecutorial 
Immunity, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 1, 3 (2009). 
153 Johns, A Black Robe, supra note 148, at 269. 
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Some scholars argue that § 1983 has no language in it to suggest that Con-
gress intended official immunity defenses for defendants in civil rights actions, 
nor did Congress intend to preserve any type of immunity.154 However, the 
Court does not agree with this position as it has interpreted the 1871 Congres-
sional legislation to preserve and retain the common law immunities.155 
b. Public Policy Underpinnings of Judicial Immunity 
Public policy anchors the doctrine of judicial immunity in modern ju-
risprudence. 
Judicial immunity arose because it was in the public interest to have 
judges who were at liberty to exercise their independent judgment 
about the merits of a case without fear of being mulcted for damages 
should an unsatisfied litigant be able to convince another tribunal that 
the judge acted not only mistakenly but with malice and corruption.156 
Other courts have expanded on the policy underpinnings behind judicial 
immunity, stating that “[j]udicial immunity exists not for the protection or 
benefit of a malicious or corrupt judge, but for the benefit of the people, in 
whose interest it is that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their func-
tions with independence and without fear of consequences.”157 
It is a judge’s duty to decide all cases within the judge’s jurisdiction 
that are brought before the tribunal,158 which includes “controversial cases 
that arouse the most intense feelings in the litigants.”159 A judge should be 
able to act and not have to fear that an unsatisfied litigant may hound the 
judge with burdensome litigation, charging malice or corruption with eve-
ry decision he may find disagreeable.160 Allowing litigants to pursue judges 
would impose an onerous burden on judges, and it would contribute to rul-
ings influenced by intimidation rather than rulings based on principled and 
fearless decision-making.161 A judge’s errors may, and should, be corrected 
                                                 
154 Id. at 270; David Achtenberg, Immunity Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Interpretive 
Approach and the Search for the Legislative Will, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 497, 502–11 (1992); 
Bodensteiner, supra note 149, at 76. 
155 Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268–69 (1993); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 
478, 484–85 (1991). See Stump, 435 U.S. at 356; Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 
367; see also Johns, A Black Robe, supra note 148, at 270. 
156 Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 31 (1980). 
157 Long v. Cross Reporting Service, Inc., 103 S.W.3d 249, 253 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 
2003), reh’g denied (Apr. 1, 2003), transfer denied (May 27, 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. 
Ct. 471 (U.S. 2003). 
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on appeal, rather than by action for damages.162 The rationale for judicial 
immunity rests on the public policies of “protecting the finality of judg-
ments, discouraging inappropriate collateral attacks, and preserving judi-
cial independence by insulating judges from lawsuits by unsatisfied liti-
gants.”163 These grounds have established the unique and special legal 
immunities—even absolute immunities—afforded to the judiciary, and 
only the judiciary. 
In the 1990s, public sentiment turned against government officials who 
enjoyed certain immunities not available to the general public.164 For dec-
ades, Congress had “exempted itself from significant laws relating to the 
environment, labor protection, and civil rights with which the citizens, un-
der the threat of severe penalty, were obligated to comply.”165 President 
Clinton even noted that “most Americans are actually surprised when they 
learn that some of our most basic laws don’t apply to Congress and their 
staffs.”166 The Congressional Accountability Act of 1995167 was enacted to 
address this, and was intended for all levels of government officials, low 
and high ranking, to be subject to the same laws that apply to the general 
public at large.168 Despite this, several categories of officials in the judicial 
branch and in its proximity continue to operate outside of these laws.169 
Based on the Court’s claim of judicial immunity, judges still enjoy the 
same exemptions as they have enjoyed for decades, founding judicial ex-
emption from the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 on both the 
common law tradition of judicial immunity and on public policy.170 
c. Determining What Is Judicial in Nature 
The doctrine of judicial immunity generally applies to both federal171 
and state172 judges. Judicial immunity does not automatically attach to all 
                                                 
162 Id. 
163 48A C.J.S. Judges § 207 (2012); see also Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 226 (1988). 
164 Pillai, supra note 143, at 96. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. (quoting Remarks of the President on signing the Congressional Accountability 
Act of 1995, 31 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 91 (1995)). 
167 Congressional Accountability Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-1, 109 Stat. 3 (to be 
codified at 2 U.S.C. § 1301). 
168 Pillai, supra note 143, at 96. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. 
171 Turner v. American Bar Ass’n, 407 F. Supp. 451, 481 (N.D. Tex. 1975), aff’d, 539 
F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1976). 
172 Stepanek v. Delta Cnty., 940 P.2d 364, 368 (Colo. 1997); see also 48A C.J.S. 
Judges § 209 (2012). 
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conduct of a judge, however, even if the conduct is proper for him to per-
form, but only to adjudicative conduct. Not all acts by one bearing the title 
judge are judicial.173 The Supreme Court’s approach to judicial immunity 
law determines entitlement to immunity by the functions being protected, 
rather than by the person to whom the title “judge” is attached.174 This 
functional approach distinguishes between adjudicatory acts and adminis-
trative or executive functions.175 For example, a judge is not protected by 
absolute immunity while performing administrative functions such as hir-
ing and firing. In Forrester v. White, a judge dismissed a probation officer 
on the basis of sex, violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.176 The Court held that the judge could not claim absolute 
immunity from a damages suit under § 1983 for his decision to demote 
and dismiss the probation officer.177 
A judge is not protected by absolute immunity when he or she is en-
gaged in conduct that is not within her judicial role.178 For example, a 
judge is not protected if threatening physical assault179 or carrying out an 
assault and battering a person.180 Moreover, a judge is afforded no protec-
tion if he acts without jurisdiction.181 Perhaps the most bizarre example to 
illustrate this is found in Zarcone v. Perry, where the judge ordered his 
bailiff to bring before him, in handcuffs, a coffee vendor whose coffee he 
disliked.182 The judge described the taste of the coffee as “putrid” and 
threatened the vendor in his chambers for twenty minutes.183 When sued 
                                                 
173 Mylett v. Mullican, 992 F.2d 1347, 1352 (5th Cir. 1993). 
174 Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12–13 (1991); Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 
224–25 (1988); Killinger v. Johnson, 389 F.3d 765, 770 (7th Cir. 2004); Brown v. 
Griesenauer, 970 F.2d 431, 434 (8th Cir. 1992); Mumford v. Zieba, 788 F. Supp. 987, 
990 (N.D. Ohio 1992), rev’d on other grounds, 4 F.3d 429 (6th Cir. 1993); Johnson v. 
Foti, 583 So. 2d 1210, 1212 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1991). 
175 46 AM. JUR. 2D Judges § 68 (2006). 
176 Forrester, 484 U.S. at 219. 
177 Id. 
178 MICHAEL AVERY ET AL., POLICE MISCONDUCT: LAW AND LITIGATION § 3:2, at 3–7 
(3d ed. 1996). 
179 Ammons v. Baldwin, 705 F.2d 1445, 1448 (5th Cir. 1983). 
180 See, e.g., Archie v. Lanier, 95 F.3d 438, 441 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that “stalking 
and sexually assaulting a person, no matter the circumstances, do not constitute ‘judicial 
acts’”); Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59, 64 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding that a judge has no 
immunity for the use of physical force to personally remove an individual from the 
courtroom); see also Dean v. Byerley, 354 F.3d 540, 556 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that the 
Regulation Counsel for the State Bar of Michigan was not performing adjudicative function 
when he threatened picketer with arrest and the prospect of never practicing law in state). 
181 MICHAEL AVERY ET AL., supra note 178, at 3–5. 
182 Zarcone v. Perry, 572 F.2d 52, 53 (2d Cir. 1978). 
183 Id. 
2013] BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE AS AN IMMUNITY 549 
by the street coffee vendor, the judge was not entitled to immunity, and 
the coffee vendor recovered substantial damages.184 
Finally, the doctrine does not protect judges from gross criminal 
acts—even if technically performed within the jurisdiction of the judge.185 
The widely publicized “Kids-for-Cash” scandal186 involved two former 
Pennsylvania judges and tested the boundaries of the doctrine of judicial 
immunity.187 Eventually the judges pled guilty to, inter alia, honest ser-
vices fraud and tax evasion188 in connection with their scheme of sending 
numerous juveniles to detention centers in exchange for more than $2.8 
million in kickbacks.189 The judges’ plea bargains were rejected and re-
placed with harsher sentences and longer prison times.190 
2. Prosecutorial Immunity 
The vast majority of prosecutors are ethical lawyers engaged in neces-
sary public service, and they maintain a crucial role in the criminal justice 
system. Prosecutors are often accused of misconduct when upset and dis-
satisfied litigants feel that a prosecutor has overreached his role as an of-
ficer of the court and public servant. In order to enable a prosecutor to car-
ry out the duties of her position in the most effective and efficient manner 
possible, yet deter and punish genuine misconduct, a system of absolute 
and qualified immunities has developed. 
a. Public Policy Underpinnings of Prosecutorial Immunity 
The immunities protecting prosecutors are a fundamental element in the 
criminal justice system. There are five general policy arguments in support 
of prosecutorial immunities. 
First, the threat of a lawsuit would undermine the effective execution of 
a prosecutor’s responsibilities. Presumably, a prosecutor would be more 
                                                 
184 Id. 
185 E.g., Neal v. Director, 400 F. Supp. 2d 134, 143 (D.D.C. 2005); Braatelien v. United 
States, 147 F.2d 888, 895 (8th Cir. 1945). 
186 Clark v. Conahan, 737 F. Supp. 2d 239, 256–57 (M.D. Pa. 2010). 
187 Ashby Jones, New Lawsuits Try to Pierce Shield of Judicial Immunity. WALL ST. J., Nov. 
12, 2009, at A21, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125798232401944303.html. 
188 Pa. Judge Gets 28 Years in “Kids for Cash” Case, CBSNEWS.COM (August 11, 2011, 
4:36 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/08/11/national/main20091371.shtml. 
189 Michael R. Sisak and Patrick Sweet, ‘Boss’ Conahan Sentenced to 17½ Years, 
THE CITIZEN’S VOICE (Sept. 21, 2011), http://citizensvoice.com/boss-conahan-sentenced
-to-17-years-1.1207996 (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). 
190 Id. Ciavarella was eventually sentenced to twenty-eight years in prison, and Conahan 
was sentenced to seventeen and one-half years in federal prison. Id. 
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cautious in bringing criminal charges and less zealous at trial if the threat of 
a civil rights suit hung over his head. Second, criminal defendants might be 
tempted to bring such suits for purposes of retaliation. Such suits would sap 
a prosecutor’s energy and “his attention would be diverted from the pressing 
duty of enforcing the criminal law.” Third, even the most honest prosecutor 
would become entangled in these suits, requiring “a virtual retrial of the 
criminal offense in a new forum.” Such burdens would be “unique and in-
tolerable.” Fourth, post-conviction remedies such as appeals and habeas 
corpus proceedings are more appropriate remedies because they focus on 
the overall fairness of the trial and not solely upon the prosecutor’s alleged 
misconduct. Finally, criminal and other punitive remedies already exist 
against a prosecutor who violates the law and, as a result, “immunity of 
prosecutors from liability in suits under [§] 1983 does not leave the public 
powerless to deter misconduct or to punish that which occurs.”191 
Prosecutorial immunity, like judicial immunity, is rooted in both the 
common law and public policy.192 Two types of immunity have emerged 
and apply to prosecutors in litigation under a § 1983 action: absolute im-
munity and qualified immunity. A functional test, which was introduced by 
the Supreme Court in Imbler v. Pachtman and further developed in Buckley 
v. Fitzsimmons,193 is employed to determine which immunity applies, and it 
is largely dependent on the function the prosecutor was performing at the 
time of the misconduct.194 Imbler v. Pachtman,195 a widely cited and influ-
ential case, decided the question of immunity for prosecutors under § 1983. 
Imbler “created a broad rule of absolute immunity” for prosecutors196 to 
shield them from civil liability and enable them to perform their duties as 
ministers of justice.197 According to the Court, absolute immunity should be 
                                                 
191 BENNET L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT § 14:14, at 14–33 (2d ed. 1999). 
192 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 420–28 (1976). Some academics argue that the 
Court’s understanding of prosecutorial immunity being rooted in the common law is in 
error, stating that the first case affording prosecutors absolute immunity was not decided 
until 1896. See Margaret Z. Johns, Reconsidering Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity, 2005 
BYU L. REV. 53, 55 (2005). 
193 Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993). The Court reiterated that pros-
ecutors should receive absolute immunity for acts done in preparation for or during a 
judicial proceeding. Id. at 260. The Court, distinguishing these adversarial acts from those 
that were investigative or administrative, held that prosecutors should receive only quali-
fied immunity for investigative or administrative functions. Id. 
194 Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 127–29 (1997); Buckley, 509 U.S. at 268–69; 
Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991). 
195 Imbler, 424 U.S. 409. 
196 Lesley E. Williams, The Civil Regulation of Prosecutors, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 
3441, 3455 (1999). 
197 Imbler, 424 U.S. at 425. 
2013] BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE AS AN IMMUNITY 551 
granted to a prosecutor for activities “intimately associated with the judicial 
phase of the criminal process.”198 The Court avoided detailed language 
about what exactly the “judicial phase” is, but did state that at the very least, 
it would include any action the prosecutor might undertake in his role as 
advocate for the state.199 
After Imbler, the Court addressed the nuances of prosecutorial immun-
ity in Burns v. Reed,200 where it emphasized that, in determining immuni-
ty, the focus should be on the nature of the act, rather than the job title of 
the actor.201 It also held that a probable cause hearing was “intimately as-
sociated with the judicial phase of the criminal process” and a prosecutor 
is protected by immunity for any conduct within that process of obtaining 
a search warrant.202 The Court also recognized that giving advice to the 
police is an investigative function and is therefore only eligible for quali-
fied immunity.203 
b. Absolute Immunity for a Prosecutor 
The Supreme Court, not the legislature, has extended the principles of 
absolute immunity beyond application to judges. In certain circumstances, 
the Court has recognized that legislators,204 the President,205 and prosecu-
tors206 can also claim absolute immunity. 
Absolute immunity will generally apply when prosecutors act as advo-
cates. This includes conduct geared toward the initiation of a prosecution or 
in preparation for a judicial proceeding, “including prosecutorial conduct 
before grand juries, statements made during trial, examination of witnesses, 
                                                 
198 Id. at 430. 
199 Id. at 430–31. 
200 Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1991). The Court opined that “qualified rather than 
absolute immunity is sufficient to protect government officials in the exercise of their 
duties” and that the Court had been “quite sparing” in its recognition of absolute immunity. 
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201 Id. at 495–96. 
202 Id. at 479. 
203 Id. at 493. 
204 See Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 
405 (1979) (regarding regional legislators); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 616 
(1972) (regarding federal legislators); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372–75 
(1951) (regarding state legislators). 
205 See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749 (1982). 
206 Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396, 404 (2d Cir. 1926), aff’d, 275 U.S. 503 (1927); see 
also MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ & JOHN E. KIRKLIN, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS AND 
DEFENSES 204 (3d ed. 1997). 
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and presentation of evidence in support of a search warrant during a prob-
able cause hearing.”207 “Under absolute immunity, prosecutors are immun-
ized even when the plaintiff establishes that the prosecutor acted intention-
ally, in bad faith, and with malice.”208 A prosecutor’s absolute immunity 
“will not be defeated because of action that was in error, done maliciously, 
or in excess of authority.”209 An official who seeks the protection of abso-
lute immunity bears the burden of demonstrating that absolute immunity is 
justified for the function in question.210 Prosecutors have been protected 
by absolute immunity in cases211 dealing with behaviors including induc-
ing perjury,212 failing to disclose exculpatory evidence,213 fabricating evi-
dence and presenting false testimony,214 improperly influencing witness-
es,215 initiating a prosecution without probable cause,216 and breaching 
plea agreements.217 
c. Qualified Immunity for a Prosecutor 
Qualified immunity applies when prosecutors act as investigators or ad-
ministrators, and courts use a functional test to determine if the acts of the 
prosecutor were investigative or administrative in nature.218 Therefore, im-
munity from liability applies only after an evaluation is made that a certain 
objective standard is met: “Under qualified immunity, prosecutors are im-
munized unless the misconduct violated clearly established law of which a 
                                                 
207 27 C.J.S. District and Prosecuting Attorneys § 59 (2012); see also Rehberg v. 
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216 Manetta v. Macomb Cnty. Enforcement Team, 141 F.3d 270, 274 (6th Cir. 1998). 
217 Pinaud, 52 F.3d at 1149. 
218 Johns, supra note 192, at 54. 
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reasonable prosecutor would have known.”219 The theory behind qualified 
immunity for a prosecutor attempts to balance providing a remedy for egre-
gious misconduct on one hand and protecting the honest prosecutor from lia-
bility on the other.220 Alleged prosecutorial misconduct that has received 
qualified immunity221 include cases with a prosecutor who swore to false 
facts in an affidavit,222 giving legal advice to the police during a criminal in-
vestigation,223 providing incorrect information in a search warrant,224 and 
failure to warn witnesses who were in danger by testifying at trial.225 
3. Legislative Immunity 
The doctrine of legislative immunity provides absolute immunity to leg-
islators at the federal, state, regional, and municipal levels when discharging 
their public duties in their legislative role. This policy is based on pre-
colonial English common law. 
The privilege of legislators to be free from arrest or civil process for what 
they do or say in legislative proceedings has taproots in the Parliamentary 
struggles of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries. As Parliament 
achieved increasing independence from the Crown, its statement of the 
privilege grew stronger .... Legislators are immune from deterrents to the 
uninhibited discharge of their legislative duties, not for their private 
indulgence but for the public good.226 
This notion of the freedom of speech and action in the legislative setting was 
so fundamental that it was incorporated into the Articles of Confederation, 
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224 Hart, 127 F.3d at 439–40. 
225 Piechowicz v. United States, 685 F. Supp. 486, 489 (D. Md. 1988). 
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the U.S. Constitution, and various state constitutions as well.227 The 
founders viewed the immunity as essential in enabling a public official to 
discharge his duties with “firmness and success” by conferring upon him 
the “fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from the re-
sentment of every one, however powerful, to whom the exercise of that 
liberty may occasion offence.”228 
In Tenney v. Brandhove, the Court protected investigations conducted 
by the Senate Fact-Finding Committee on Un-American Activities, finding 
them, however distasteful, legitimate legislative activity.229 This is true de-
spite the violations of due process committed by the committee, as well as 
the chilling effect that their activities had on free speech.230 As such, the 
committee members’ actions in conducting the investigations were entitled 
to immunity.231 In its decision, the Court said: 
The claim of an unworthy purpose does not destroy the privilege. Legis-
lators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their 
legislative duty, not for their private indulgence but for the public good. 
One must not expect uncommon courage even in legislators. The priv-
ilege would be of little value if they could be subjected to the cost and 
inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the 
pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against them based upon a 
jury’s speculation as to motives.232 
The justification for legislative immunity at the federal level is equally 
applicable to state and regional legislators.233 For example, members of 
the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, a bi-state agency created by Cali-
fornia and Nevada, were held to be immune from federal suit, as they had 
been acting in a legislative capacity.234 In its opinion, the Court said: “[T]o 
the extent the evidence discloses that these individuals were acting in a 
capacity comparable to that of members of a state legislature, they are en-
titled to absolute immunity from federal damages liability.”235 This im-
munity also applies to municipal legislators, as demonstrated in Bogan v. 
Scott-Harris, where the Court stated: “Absolute immunity for local legis-
lators under § 1983 finds support not only in history, but also in reason.... 
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The rationales for according absolute immunity to federal, state, and re-
gional legislators apply with equal force to local legislators.”236 
Legislative immunity is therefore broadly applied to all levels of gov-
ernment, and the delegates necessary for these levels to function, based on a 
functional analysis of the role being played during the alleged wrong. 
4. Qualified Immunity and Quasi-Judicial Immunity 
A wide array of public officials and other court-appointed individuals 
participate in carrying out judicial functions, and accordingly these individ-
uals are entitled to assert absolute quasi-judicial immunity.237 These include 
administrative judges,238 officials who enforce court orders,239 law clerks,240 
court clerks,241 court appointed evaluators, parole and probation officers, 
special masters, arbitrators and mediators, hearing officers, and even a pre-
siding official in an alternative dispute resolution proceeding.242 This is con-
sistent with the functional approach generally governing common-law im-
munities.243 Public policy requires that the law should afford quasi-judicial 
immunity to officials who enforce judicial orders, because while they are 
not judicial officers, they act “under the command of a court decree or ex-
plicit instructions from a judge.”244 
Many government officials “performing acts within the course of their 
official duties have immunity but that immunity is qualified in several 
ways.”245 Much of the law of qualified immunity derives from Scheuer v. 
Rhodes.246 In Scheuer, the plaintiffs’ estates brought a § 1983 suit against 
the Governor of Ohio, the Adjutant General of the Ohio National Guard 
and various guardsmen, and the President of Kent State University for 
the deaths resulting from control of a demonstration at Kent State. The 
Court found that a qualified immunity would be sufficient to protect the 
officials in their discretionary activities.247 
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One is entitled to qualified immunity when there is “the existence of 
reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time [of the action] and in 
light of all the circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief ....”248 In Butz 
v. Economou,249 the leading case on administrative immunity, the Court held 
that in a suit for damages arising from unconstitutional action, federal ex-
ecutive officials were entitled to only qualified “good faith” immunity.250 
Furthermore, the doctrine has expanded in recent decades to include 
“many defendants who are not judges, including psychologists, social 
workers, mediators, receivers, probation officers, and licensing and parole-
board members.... Under this extension of immunity, these officials escape 
liability even when they have maliciously violated constitutional protec-
tions.”251 For example, a social worker working on a child custody case was 
granted immunity even after she had omitted positive information and falsi-
fied the results of a plaintiff’s evaluation.252 However, not all courts have 
accepted expansive applications of immunity, and the circuits are split as to 
the boundaries of liability for non-judges acting in a quasi-judicial role.253 
The courts are generally in agreement with regard to qualified immuni-
ty for federal and state law enforcement and investigative officers: 
Under all circumstances, federal and state law enforcement and inves-
tigative officers are entitled to only qualified immunity. Both Pierson v. 
Ray and Bivens confirmed that the courts would not go beyond the qual-
ified immunity available to police at common law. The courts acknow-
ledged that police work involves a great deal of discretion especially in 
determining whether and how to arrest someone. Limited immunity, the 
courts held, would be sufficient to allow the officers to continue to exercise 
that discretion but would act as a safeguard to prevent overzealousness. 
.... 
[A]s expressed by the Court in Bivens, qualified immunity requires that the 
officer must have acted in good faith and with a reasonable belief in the 
validity of the arrest and search and in the necessity for carrying out the 
arrest or search in the way the arrest was made and the search was conduc-
ted. The Supreme Court in Pierson similarly stated the test for immunity.254 
                                                 
248 Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 247–48; see also KOCH, supra note 245, at 249–50. 
249 KOCH, supra note 245, at 249–50 (“In Butz, the petitioner alleged that Department of 
Agriculture employees unsuccessfully had tried to revoke or suspend the registration of his 
commodity futures commission company. The petitioner claimed that the Department insti-
tuted the proceedings solely in retaliation for his criticism of commodity operations and that 
not only had the Department’s conduct of the hearings deprived him of due process, but the 
entire affair had violated his First Amendment rights.”). 
250 Id. 
251 Johns, A Black Robe, supra note 148, at 266–67. 
252 Hughes v. Long, 242 F.3d 121, 125–28 (3d Cir. 2001). 
253 Johns, A Black Robe, supra note 148, at 266–67. 
254 KOCH, supra note 245, at 250 (footnotes omitted). 
2013] BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE AS AN IMMUNITY 557 
Individuals are not the only ones to enjoy immunity. Certain organiza-
tions, which are considered legal persons, also enjoy immunity. For exam-
ple, self-regulatory organizations enjoy a form of immunity: 
Since the passage of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange 
Act), self-regulatory organizations (SROs), like Nasdaq, have enjoyed 
absolute immunity for acts carried out under the quasi-governmental 
powers of the Exchange Act. Courts have generally held that SROs will 
receive protection from the Exchange Act so long as their “alleged mis-
conduct falls within the scope of [their] quasi-governmental powers.” But 
recently, there has been a trend by SROs to become for-profit entities. 
Since 2000, [and as of 2008] seven of the ten largest U.S. stock 
exchanges have filed initial public offerings with the SEC and re-
linquished their nonprofit status. As a consequence of such filings, SROs, 
like Nasdaq, have been struggling to maintain their identities as quasi-
governmental entities. Thus, the issue becomes whether an SRO’s 
actions in furthering profit-making activity fall within its quasi-
governmental powers under the Exchange Act.255 
The first time a plaintiff pierced the veil of immunity of a stock ex-
change was in the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Weissman v. NASD, Inc.256 
To be sure, self-regulatory organizations do not enjoy complete immunity 
from suits. Only when an SRO is “acting under the aegis of the Exchange 
Act’s delegated authority” does it enjoy that privilege. Absolute immunity 
is not appropriate unless the relevant conduct constitutes a delegated quasi-
governmental prosecutorial, regulatory or disciplinary function.257 
The court held for the first time that an SRO was not entitled to abso-
lute immunity.258 This decision, although not yet followed in other circuits, 
moved away from the long-standing and liberal application of absolute 
immunity for SROs and established a new test to determine whether an 
SRO is entitled to such immunity.259 Time will tell if other circuits follow 
suit or not, but “it is clear for the time being, given the court’s emphasis 
on private versus regulatory actions, that piercing the veil of absolute im-
munity favors plaintiffs like Steve Weissman when SROs perform any 
function outside their quasi-governmental role.”260 
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B. Selected Private Actor Immunities 
Immunity from suit also exists for certain private individuals acting in a 
non-state type role, in some situations.261 Less attention in the immunity 
field is paid to these private actor immunities, which generally exist when 
actors engage in a certain role or activity unrelated to their occupations, and 
provide powerful protections to protect the exercise of discretion. While the 
theme of public service performed through specified occupations underpins 
the public role immunities, private actor immunities are more centered on 
roles or situations that an individual might find themselves to be in, some of 
which might be highly unusual or non-recurring. 
1. Good Samaritan Immunity 
So-called “Good Samaritan” statutes grant immunity from civil liability 
for negligent acts or omissions committed by certain individuals who have 
voluntarily provided emergency care to injured parties.262 The statutory terms 
and classes of protected individuals vary by jurisdiction,263 but generally, 
courts limit Good Samaritan protection to individuals without a pre-existing 
duty to render assistance.264 Some jurisdictions extend immunity to anyone 
administering emergency care, while others limit protection to certain medi-
cal personnel.265 First responders, such as law enforcement and firefighters, 
are typically covered by other statutes that specifically apply to them. Similar-
ly, Good Samaritan protection extends only to physicians who treat patients 
while not on call, or who are not required to respond as part of their hospital 
function.266 Good Samaritans must provide at least a minimal standard of 
care, although the extent of minimum care also varies by jurisdiction. In some 
jurisdictions, Good Samaritans statutes expressly apply to assistance provided 
in an “ordinary prudent manner.”267 Still another jurisdiction grants immunity 
to Good Samaritans who provided emergency care in “good faith;”268 while 
yet another jurisdiction grants immunity to all care except care constituting 
“gross negligence.”269 
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Typically, Good Samaritan statutes require that the care rendered be 
“emergency care,” and at least one jurisdiction construes “emergency” 
narrowly.270 In Muller v. McMillian Warner Ins. Co., the court determined 
that the initial evaluation and immediate assistance provided by the par-
ents of a minor all-terrain vehicle (ATV) driver to his injured passenger 
upon their arrival at the parent’s home following an ATV accident did 
constitute “emergency care.”271 However, the court held that the care the 
parents provided some six or more hours later, prior to calling 911, did not 
constitute “emergency care,” and as such, the parents were not entitled to 
Good Samaritan immunity.272 The court found that the parents had cared 
for the individual longer than necessary to transfer her to professional 
medical care.273 Other jurisdictions have held that physicians who provide 
medical treatment that is not immediately necessary do not provide 
“emergency care” within the meaning of Good Samaritan statutes.274 For 
instance, in Gragg v. Neurological Associates, the court held that the 
treatment of a fractured and dislocated ankle bone caused by a motorcycle 
accident did not constitute emergency treatment.275 Similarly, in Lewis v. 
Soriano, the court held that although the patient needed treatment without 
undue delay, there were orthopedic surgeons available within thirty miles, 
and so the treatment could have been delayed for the short time necessary 
to transport the patient to qualified specialists.276 Finally, many jurisdic-
tions hold that Good Samaritan immunity does not extend to individuals 
who created the emergency necessitating the treatment.277 In Markman v. 
Kotler, the court held that the defendant doctor would not be held to the 
lesser standard of care for Good Samaritans if he had created the emergen-
cy.278 The court also held that the jury could find for the plaintiff if the 
doctor’s conduct had decreased the decedent’s chances of survival.279 The 
State of Utah’s Good Samaritan statute codifies this point of law.280 In its 
holding granting immunity to National Park Service employees, the court 
in Flynn v. United States emphasized that the employees did not cause an 
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accident resulting in injuries to a pedestrian, who herself had been render-
ing assistance to an earlier accident victim.281 
a. Policy 
The primary purpose of these statutes is to encourage prompt emergen-
cy care by granting immunity from civil damages and removing the fear of 
liability,282 and courts enforce the statute to advance public policy. The ad-
ministering of emergency medical care is done in a stressful situation im-
mediately following the injury, often by people who are not specifically 
trained to handle medical emergencies, and public policy seeks to encour-
age assistance from bystanders by freeing them from worry about liability 
for their reasonable actions. This promotes the use of discretion in respond-
ing to a medical emergency, since a Good Samaritan will not be held liable 
as long as he provided care that met an objective standard of reasonableness 
or good faith. 
2. Parental Immunity 
The doctrine of parental immunity bars a child from bringing an action 
for damages against her parents, insulating parents from most personal inju-
ry actions brought by minor children.283 Subject to certain limitations and 
exceptions, parents are generally immune from suits brought by minor chil-
dren for acts of ordinary negligence that involve the reasonable exercise of 
parental authority or the exercise of ordinary parental discretion with respect 
to provisions for the care and necessities of the child.284 This immunity is an 
American invention, which was unknown in British or American common 
law prior to the nineteenth century.285 Parental immunity does not apply to 
cases implicating gross negligence or willful misconduct. Specifically, courts 
have held that parental immunity does not apply to parents who commit in-
tentional torts against their children.286 
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One of the earliest cases of the parental immunity doctrine involved a 
minor child appealing a judgment by the trial court that dismissed her 
claim for damages stemming from cruel and inhumane treatment at the 
hands of her stepmother with her father’s consent.287 Citing the common 
law right of a father to have “control and custody” of his child, the Ten-
nessee Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s holding.288 In Hogan v. 
Hogan, a child sued her mother for damages she incurred in an automobile 
accident in which the mother was driving.289 The court dismissed the case 
because the mother had been driving the vehicle for a family purpose and 
was, therefore, immune from suit.290 The Georgia Court of Appeals ruled 
similarly in Blake v. Blake.291 There, the parents of two minor children 
were divorced and the children were injured in an automobile accident 
while with their father.292 The court held that parental immunity applied 
because the father had been transporting his children from school, which 
constituted a family purpose.293 
a. Policy 
The parental immunity doctrine exists to preserve the integrity and 
unity of the family, to avoid unnecessary injection of the state into the 
day-to-day exercise of parental discretion, and is limited to negligence in 
conduct that relates to parental discretion in the discipline, supervision, 
and care of children.294 The rationale behind the parental immunity doc-
trine is that the right of the parent to use discretion in the discharge of the-
se parental duties could be “seriously impaired” if the parents could be 
held liable for ordinary negligence that occurs while discharging those pa-
rental duties.295 The value of preserving and promoting the free exercise of 
parental discretion outweighs the social costs imposed by the exercise of 
that discretion. 
3. Stand Your Ground Immunity 
A more controversial private immunity exists, created by “Stand Your 
Ground” laws in various states in the United States. This immunity has 
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received a great deal of attention with the ongoing Trayvon Martin case cur-
rently unfolding in Florida.296 Because the nuances of this immunity are 
state-specific, this Article will examine one state, Florida, as an example 
for illustrative purposes. 
The “Stand Your Ground” law in Florida is actually three separate stat-
utes297 that work together to allow an individual to use deadly force in self-
defense, thus excusing the person from the common law duty to retreat. 
This common law duty had required a person to use every reasonable means 
to avoid danger, including retreat, prior to using deadly force.298 The “Stand 
Your Ground” law is an expansion of the common law “Castle Doctrine,” 
which allows a person to use deadly force without a duty to retreat if the 
person was attacked in her home or workplace and reasonably believed that 
deadly force was necessary to prevent imminent death to herself or another, 
great bodily harm, or the commission of a forcible felony.299 
The Florida “Stand Your Ground” law reformulates the definition of self-
defense and 
permits a person to use force, including deadly force, without fear of 
criminal prosecution or civil action for damages, against a person who 
unlawfully and forcibly enters the person’s dwelling, residence, or oc-
cupied vehicle [and] abrogates the common law duty to retreat when 
attacked before using force, including deadly force in self-defense or 
defense of others.300 
Together, these laws “protect the defender from civil and criminal prose-
cution for unlawful use of force or deadly force in self-defense.”301 The 
immunity does not generally apply to a person who provokes the attack.302 
The two exceptions to this are (1) where there is no means of escape other 
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than the use of deadly force or (2) if the provoking person withdraws from 
physical contact or unequivocally indicates his desire to withdraw from 
the confrontation and the alleged victim continues or resumes the use of 
force.303 The Florida “Stand Your Ground” law specifically requires that 
the person invoking the defense “not [be] engaged in an unlawful activi-
ty.”304 The question of self-defense is ordinarily one for the jury.305 
Once the presumption of “reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or 
great bodily harm to himself or herself or another when using defensive 
force that is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm to anoth-
er” has been established, section 776.032 provides that the person who has 
used deadly force “is immune from criminal prosecution and civil action for 
the use of such force.”306 Although law enforcement is statutorily permitted 
to investigate the use of force, they may not arrest the person for using said 
force unless there is probable cause that the force used was unlawful.307 
This immunity, then, is granted whenever two conditions are met.308 
The first condition is that the defender used deadly force against a person 
who was in the process of unlawfully and forcefully entering, or had unlaw-
fully and forcibly entered, a dwelling, residence, occupied vehicle, or any 
other place that the defender had the right to be.309 The second condition is 
that the defender “had reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry 
or unlawful or forcible act was occurring or had occurred.”310 This second 
condition nullifies the common law presumption that the use of force after 
the danger had passed was presumptively retaliatory, and thus not consid-
ered self-defense.311 Therefore, with the inclusion of this second condition, 
the Florida legislature expanded its consideration of what constitutes self-
defense for the purposes of a statutory grant of immunity. 
a. Policy 
Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” law advances the state’s public policy pro-
tecting law-abiding citizens and gives them the right to “protect themselves, 
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their families, and others from intruders and attackers without fear of 
prosecution or civil action for acting in defense of themselves and oth-
ers.”312 It reflects the social value that people should expect to be safe in 
places where they have the right to be, and they should not be required to 
“needlessly retreat in the face of intrusion or attack.”313 This allows a per-
son to be held to a reasonableness standard when gauging the threat level 
facing her, rather than requiring a reasonableness standard to determine 
the appropriateness of the behavior or reaction made by the person when 
using her discretion.314 In other words, the reasonableness standard gauges 
the existence of the threat, not the reaction thereto. A person is entitled to 
use her discretion to react to a threat, and will not be penalized for the out-
come as long as the perception of the existence of the threat was reasonable. 
III. BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE AS A FORM OF IMMUNITY? 
A. Philosophy 
The main policy underpinnings of all the forms of immunity, absolute 
or qualified, public or private, examined in this Article can be summarized 
as follows: 
 To encourage the recipient of the immunity to have the lib-
erty to exercise independent judgment, especially on things 
that may be controversial or risky, in a situation or situa-
tions that require the exercise of discretion for important 
decisions to be made. This will allow the effective execu-
tion of the recipient’s duties, roles, or rights, and avoid 
making the recipient unduly cautious or less zealous in car-
rying them out. Put another way, it is given in situations 
where people need to make decisions that involve interpre-
tation, in order to encourage people to make the best decision 
they can, rather than forcing them to make the obviously 
safe decision.315 
 To give the recipient comfort that persons who are unhappy 
with his or her decisions, whether these decisions were right 
or wrong in hindsight, cannot retaliate or provide a nuisance 
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that might distract from the exercise of the recipient’s duties, 
roles, or rights. This would impose too high of a burden on 
the recipient. This means that the recipient is allowed to 
make certain mistakes in making these decisions and is not 
expected to become the guarantor for perfection in executing 
his or her role.316 
 Remedies are available for errors made by many of the recipi-
ents of immunity. For example, appeals are available to cor-
rect errors in judgment by a judge or prosecutor, which focus 
on overall fairness rather than on any one individual. Legisla-
tors can be removed from office by being voted out in the 
next election by the will of the people (the primary stakehold-
ers) and legislation can be amended or repealed. Usually there 
are safeguards in the relevant system to ensure that a mistake 
by one person need not have a permanent impact. In addition, 
there are other sanctions available against recipients who 
commit wrongs in carrying out their jobs or roles if the behav-
ior is egregious—criminal and other statutes provide penalties 
for many misbehaviors committed by individuals abusing 
their position or role, such as parents abusing their children, or 
a Good Samaritan who goes overboard and decides to per-
form a tracheotomy with a pen tube and paper clip when the 
patient only skinned her knee. These additional penalties are 
especially important in the context of absolute immunities, 
where a functional analysis rather than an objective standard 
results in the application of the immunity protection.317 
The policy reasons underpinning the business judgment rule can be 
summarized as such: 
 To allow directors the liberty to exercise their independent 
judgment and authority by making decisions that they think 
are appropriate, especially on things that may be controver-
sial or risky. This will allow the effective execution of the re-
cipient’s duties, and will avoid making the recipient unduly 
cautious or less zealous in carrying them out. It is absolutely 
necessary that directors exercise their judgment to benefit 
the corporation and its shareholders from a practical stand-
point, as well as being required from a legal one.318 
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 To give directors comfort that persons who are unhappy with 
their decisions, whether these decisions were right or wrong 
in hindsight, cannot retaliate or provide a nuisance that 
might distract from the directors’ duties. This would impose 
too high of a burden on the directors.319 
 Remedies are available for errors made by individual direc-
tors in other ways. First of all, there are usually many direc-
tors on a board of directors, so one director generally should 
not be able to highjack or otherwise harm the corporation. In 
addition, shareholders who are unhappy with the decisions 
made by a director, or team of directors, have the ability to 
vote them out of office annually. They can replace those di-
rectors with ones who will take a different approach to deci-
sions that might be more in accordance with shareholders’ 
wishes or philosophies. There are other sanctions against di-
rectors who commit wrongs in carrying out their jobs if the 
behavior is egregious—criminal and other statutes provide 
penalties for much misbehavior committed by individuals 
abusing their position.320 
As demonstrated above, the policy reasons underpinning the business 
judgment rule mirror the policy reasons underpinning the different types 
of immunities examined in this Article. The recipients of the protections 
afforded by both are people who are, through employment or otherwise, in 
positions that require the exercise of discretion in order for their role to be 
carried out effectively. The more discretion that is required to be exercised 
in a position or role, the more protection that needs to be afforded to the 
individual in the position. This is not because of the individuals them-
selves per se, but rather because the integrity of the job or position, as well 
as its social role, must be maintained. Each type of recipient has a socially 
important role that is bigger than the individual, or at least a role that is an 
essential component of a system that has social benefit. This ranges from 
the justice system, in public immunities, to the family unit, to the integrity 
of the individual person, which is highly valued in American society in 
private immunities. The protection afforded to both recipients of immunity 
and directors is based on the idea that it is the positions that are socially 
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valuable, rather than the individuals who occupy those positions. As such, 
the more important the role played is to society, and the more important 
the ability to make controversial decisions within this role, the stronger the 
immunity granted to those who occupy it. 
While the importance of the roles, both public and private, of those 
protected by immunities might be evident, as they tend to be part of the 
larger system of justice and society, it may be argued that the same is true 
of the role played by directors. Corporations have become essential actors 
in the modern economy, and the legal fiction of personhood for these cor-
porations requires that others think on behalf of the corporations. If direc-
tors, the brain trust tasked with thinking for a corporation, are fearful of 
personal liability for the decisions they make on behalf of the corporation, 
the corporation, and by extension the U.S. economy, will suffer as a result. 
The policy comparison demonstrates identical goals between immunities 
and the business judgment rule, and as such, the practicality of viewing the 
business judgment rule as an immunity can further illustrate the point. 
B. Practicality—The Business Judgment Rule as an Immunity 
1. Procedural Example of an Immunity 
To see how immunity is established from a procedural standpoint, it is 
helpful to illustrate the process by which it is given, and how it applies in 
practice. As such, the immunity from the Florida “Stand Your Ground” law 
is briefly explored here. 
The Florida “Stand Your Ground” law was intended to establish a true 
immunity and not merely an affirmative defense.321 In Peterson v. State, the 
court stated, “a defendant may raise the question of statutory immunity pretri-
al and, when such a claim is raised, the trial court must determine whether the 
defendant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the immunity 
attaches.”322 When properly raised, the “statutory immunity claim is resolved 
by the circuit court after a pretrial evidentiary hearing.”323 The defendant 
bears the burden to prove entitlement to the immunity by a preponderance of 
the evidence.324 At this stage, the trial court must weigh and decide factual 
disputes as to the defendant’s use of force to determine whether to dismiss the 
case based on the immunity.325 Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190 sets 
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out procedures for the filing and consideration of a motion to dismiss in a 
criminal proceeding.326 The relevant provisions of the rule state: 
(b) Motion to Dismiss; Grounds. All defenses available to a defendant by 
plea, other than not guilty, shall be made only by motion to dismiss the 
indictment or information, whether the same shall relate to matters of 
form, substance, former acquittal, former jeopardy, or any other defense. 
(c) Time for Moving to Dismiss. Unless the court grants further time, the 
defendant shall move to dismiss the indictment or information either 
before or at arraignment. The court in its discretion may permit the defen-
dant to plead and thereafter to file a motion to dismiss at a time to be set by 
the court. Except for objections based on fundamental grounds, every 
ground for a motion to dismiss that is not presented by a motion to dismiss 
within the time hereinabove provided shall be considered waived.327 
Accordingly, the immunity is typically decided through a motion to 
dismiss, at an early stage of the litigation process. This makes sense, as the 
true value of an immunity is not only in preventing judgment or liability 
from attaching to a defendant, but also in keeping the defendant’s legal 
bills and troubles to a minimum by abbreviating the ordeal. 
To see how an immunity operates in a civil context, the Good Samaritan 
immunity gives a good example. Immunity under Good Samaritan statutes 
is an affirmative defense. Generally, a defendant moves for summary judg-
ment based upon the state’s Good Samaritan statute. In Georgia, on such a 
motion for summary judgment, the burden is on the movant to show that 
there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.328 Georgia code states as follows: 
For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, 
or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time 
after the expiration of 30 days from the commencement of the action or 
after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in 
his favor upon all or any part thereof. 
For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought may, at any 
time, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judg-
ment in his favor as to all or any part thereof. 
Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 30 
days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to 
the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought 
shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
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interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law; but nothing 
in this Code section shall be construed as denying to any party the right 
to trial by jury where there are substantial issues of fact to be determined. 
A summary judgment may be rendered on the issue of liability alone 
although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damage.329 
The essence of the motion for summary judgment is that there is no 
genuine issue of material fact to be resolved by the trier of the fact, and that 
movant is entitled to judgment on the law applicable to the established 
facts.330 Georgia Code. section 9-11-56 is similar to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, and 
on review it is proper for the appellate court to consider federal rulings.331 
After viewing these two examples, it is apparent that the person claim-
ing the protection of the immunity must establish her entitlement thereto, 
whether through a motion for summary judgment or a motion to dismiss. 
There is no complete presumption that the office of the person, in the case 
of an absolute immunity, or the actions of the person, in the case of a qual-
ified immunity, automatically establish entitlement to the immunity; in-
stead, an evaluation of the role the defendant was acting in at the time of 
the injury must be done to establish absolute immunity, or a good faith or 
reasonableness evaluation must be done to establish the application of the 
qualified immunity. The important point here is that the defendant must 
establish that he or she is entitled to immunity. 
2. Business Judgment Rule in Practice as an Immunity 
The effect of the business judgment rule is to insulate directors from 
liability for their business-related decisions. It provides immunity to direc-
tors acting in the role of “director.” As long as the conditions for the ap-
plication of the business judgment rule are met, the courts will not assess 
the quality of the decision. This has a direct parallel to immunity. When 
someone attempts to hold an individual, who may qualify for the protec-
tion of a type of immunity, liable for an action, the court determines if the 
immunity applies, with the burden of proof on the person asserting im-
munity to prove that it is justified for the function or act in question. In the 
case of a judicial immunity, that means determining whether the action 
complained of falls within a judge’s adjudicative conduct. In prosecutorial 
immunity, it must be demonstrated that the prosecutor was acting as an 
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advocate for absolute immunity, or as an investigator or administrator for 
qualified immunity. This functional analysis must be made prior to grant-
ing immunity, and is analogous to the procedural evaluation that is done in 
the standard of liability interpretation of the business judgment rule. The 
main focus of this procedural analysis differs, however, in that one does 
not focus on the role being played by the director during the alleged harm, 
or even a specific objective, good faith test. Rather, the focus is on a pro-
cedural checklist of disqualifiers. However, it might be helpful to delve 
into this analysis deeper. 
The disqualifying behaviors are ones that tend to demonstrate violations 
of the duty of loyalty, which cannot be said to be part of the director’s role: 
fraud, illegality, self-dealing, no decision made, failure to inform oneself 
appropriately, and the like. These are generally rent-seeking behaviors that 
typically are done to enhance the director as an individual, rather than fulfill 
an element of the director’s directorial duties. There are two possible inter-
pretations to be made here, with one being stronger than the other. 
The first interpretation, which is the weaker of the two, is to interpret the 
assessment of these factors as a form of functional analysis generally done 
for absolute immunities. If one of the disqualifying conditions for the busi-
ness judgment rule—fraud, illegality, self-dealing, no decision, and so on—
is present, then the effect is to deem the director as having done the alleged-
ly wrongful actions as an individual, and not while functioning as a direc-
tor—the opposite of a safe harbor. Determining the functions of a director 
by negative rather than positive definition may appear to be a backwards 
approach; despite this awkwardness, the behaviors and parameters of the 
role are still defined as such. This recognizes that not all actions done by 
one with the title “director” are directorial in nature. The usual immunities 
requiring a functional analysis to determine eligibility for the immunity 
(judge, prosecutor) have absolute immunity protections. For various rea-
sons, however, absolute immunity is not appropriate for a director. 
First of all, directors have entered into a private agreement to serve in 
a directorial capacity, and they should be accountable to a select class of 
people, namely the shareholders of the corporation who elected them to 
their position. The importance of the role of the corporation in society 
should not obviate the fact that some accountability needs to exist for ac-
tions done by directors acting as directors. This is especially true since 
most of the literature addressing the business judgment rule discusses the 
rule as attempting to reach a balance between director authority and ac-
countability to shareholders; if directors were to receive the benefit of an 
absolute immunity, where anything done in their role as a director was 
immune from civil liability, then accountability is not possible. Absolute 
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immunity may apply to malicious acts, as outlined by the U.S. Supreme 
Court,332 but since the persons harmed in the business judgment rule context 
(the shareholders) have a direct relationship to the director, it is not appro-
priate for a director to hide behind “social importance” when this type of 
harm is done in the context of a private relationship. The balancing act that 
underpins the business judgment rule would be completely forfeit, as there 
would be no accountability whatsoever, and this does not make sense. 
Secondly, the strength of the immunities granted correlate to the social 
role and the importance of unfettered discretion. While directors are undeni-
ably important indirect actors in the economy, it strains credulity to assert 
that their importance to American society rivals that of a judge, upon whom 
the entire success of the nation’s legal system hinges. The very nature of the 
director role, rooted in private contract but with social impact, makes it 
more appropriate to interpret the business judgment rule as akin to the quali-
fied immunities afforded others who have socially valuable roles but who 
must be kept in check to prevent abuses, such as police officers. 
The other, stronger interpretation is to regard the preconditions for ap-
plication of the business judgment rule as being the elements of the objec-
tive standard required for application of a qualified immunity. The pre-
conditions for application of the business judgment rule—good faith, no 
self-dealing, no illegality, and so on—all represent reasonableness, or in-
dicate the good faith that is the standard for application of qualified im-
munities. In qualified immunities, the actor is accorded immunity after an 
evaluation is made that his actions were either reasonable given the expec-
tations of his position, or were done in good faith, depending on the exact 
immunity in question. This inquiry does not address whether the action 
was right or wrong, just whether it was in the realm of expectation for 
someone in the position given the situation in which the person was. Good 
faith and reasonableness do not provide absolute protection to a director, 
but when the preconditions for application of the business judgment rule 
are examined, and with these being taken as fulfilling the objective stand-
ard and good faith requirement, it makes it easy for a director to know the 
expectations that are on him. 
3. Procedure 
Like any other defendant in civil litigation with a defense that may result 
in the dismissal of the case, a defendant’s entitlement to a case-ending de-
fense is evaluated by the court prior to said dismissal. The integrity of our tort 
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system depends on it. While plaintiffs carry the burden of proof in establishing 
their claim, defendants should carry the burden of denying the plaintiffs their 
day in court. This is one area in which immunities can help inform the judi-
cial treatment of the business judgment rule, to bring about consistency in 
how courts evaluate a defendant’s claim to the protection of the business 
judgment rule. Consistency is an issue, given that different judges have taken 
different approaches to establishing the order of things considered. 
If the business judgment rule is a form of immunity, then the “standard 
of liability” formulation to ordering matters makes the most sense, even if 
the underlying effect has not been well enunciated. This procedure still 
needs to be plainly set forth, however. The procedural evaluation that hap-
pens under this formulation is akin to the evaluation that needs to be done 
prior to establishing that a particular immunity protects a defendant from 
liability. This is true whether the defendant would enjoy absolute immuni-
ty, or a lesser qualified immunity. If this is the proper procedure to be fol-
lowed for determining if a judge, who has a socially invaluable role, is 
protected from personal liability, then it does not make sense to assert 
lesser procedure to insulate a director from liability, as proposed by the 
“abstention” approach. If a functional analysis, rather than “no analysis 
unless a reason is presented” approach, has not deterred quality candidates 
from sitting on the bench, it seems unlikely that a procedural evaluation 
would do so for quality prospective directors. The same can be said about 
a possible chilling effect on decision-making. It is likely that directors just 
want to have a clear understanding of what the expectations of their role 
are, where the line in the sand is drawn, and the procedure for dealing with 
potential problems that might arise. This approach does not attack director 
authority in any meaningful way. While authority is necessary to any posi-
tion, it is tempered by accountability and review: very few jobs enjoy un-
fettered discretion with no review for misconduct, and it must be remem-
bered that a directorship is a job. As such, a procedural evaluation to 
ensure that a director did in fact act within his directorial role or function, 
or acted reasonably, does not erode his true authority—that would only 
happen if the substance of the decisions made were reviewed. Some case 
law touches on this, as the court in Cede states, the business judgment rule 
protects directors who act within their actual or apparent authority in the 
absence of fraud, bad faith, or self-dealing.333 This could be read as view-
ing the nullifying factors as part of a short-form analysis, as authority gen-
erally defines the boundaries of one’s position and the behaviors that 
might be considered reasonable. Whether according a person absolute or 
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qualified immunity, the starting point is to ensure that the person was act-
ing in a role attached to the immunity, before assessing anything else. 
The difference in approaches between “standard of liability” and “ab-
stention” might best be viewed by using an example from the immunity 
arena. Individuals asserting an entitlement to an immunity must establish 
that entitlement. Therefore, if a plaintiff sues a judge, the judge must 
demonstrate that she is entitled to immunity because the alleged miscon-
duct was done while she was acting in her judicial function. If she suc-
ceeds, the suit is dismissed; if she fails, the suit proceeds and the plaintiff 
must meet the burden of proof to establish the alleged wrong. If the “ab-
stention doctrine” formulation were applied in the case of immunities, the 
plaintiff would have to prove that the judge was not acting in her judicial 
function (that is, was not entitled to the immunity) before the suit could 
proceed. This might not seem like too big of a burden, but burdens are as-
signed in the justice system for a reason, and it is also inefficient. This is 
an example of information asymmetry, where the judge can easily demon-
strate something that will take the plaintiff more time and effort to do so. 
Although the common law is not completely efficient, this should be a 
consideration. Moreover, it makes sense that anyone asking for special 
treatment should have to establish entitlement thereto. A bedrock principle 
of our legal system is that people who have been wronged must have their 
“day in court” to be heard. If we are going to deny this right to sharehold-
ers, it stands to reason that the person trying to deny them this fundamen-
tal catharsis must demonstrate a compelling reason to do so. Equity de-
mands this. Demonstrating the “abstention doctrine” formulation in the 
context of judicial immunity shows that it is not the best way to approach 
director immunity. To be sure, authority does require judicial respect for 
the substance of directorial decisions. This, however, has nothing to do 
with substance; it is a procedural evaluation that addresses functions, noth-
ing more. Authority is preserved, and the integrity of the tort system is al-
so maintained. The two considerations need not be mutually exclusive; 
they demonstrate the balancing of authority and accountability at the heart 
of the business judgment rule. 
The integrity of directorial authority is still maintained if the business 
judgment rule is interpreted as an immunity. Disgruntled shareholders 
cannot bring suit more easily, nor is a director quantifiably more vulnera-
ble. There are many hurdles that a shareholder has to clear in order to sue 
a director personally, not the least of which is the burden of proof, and in 
many situations, directors will be indemnified by private contract, statute, 
or director’s insurance. Having the director prove, rather than the share-
holder disprove, that the business judgment rule applies to prevent liability 
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for decision made by the director is simply a part of the balancing act be-
tween authority and accountability. 
CONCLUSION 
“When I see a bird that walks like a duck and swims like a duck and 
quacks like a duck, I call that bird a duck.”334 The business judgment rule 
“walks” like an immunity, “swims” like an immunity, and “quacks” like an 
immunity. It has the same policy underpinnings as an immunity, the same 
procedure as an immunity (at least in some courts), and has the same effect 
as an immunity. This is an example of strong inductive reasoning, and sup-
ports the argument that the business judgment rule is a form of immunity. 
If the courts viewed the business judgment rule as an immunity, this 
could drastically reduce the confusion surrounding its interpretation, pro-
mote uniformity amongst the circuits and levels, and simplify the jobs of 
countless litigators. Understanding that the business judgment rule is an 
immunity should help clarify the procedures needed to qualify for the pro-
tections, as well as the reasons for these procedures. As such, it is time to 
recognize the business judgment rule as a member of the family of immuni-
ties, and invite it to take its rightful role within that family. 
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